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ABSTRACT 
  This Article addresses the rise of “co-religionist commerce” in the 
United States—that is, the explosion of commercial dealings that take 
place between co-religionists who intend their transactions to achieve 
both commercial and religious objectives. To remain viable, co-
religionist commerce requires all the legal support necessary to sustain 
all other commercial relationships. Contracts must be enforced, 
parties must be protected against torts, and disputes must be reliably 
adjudicated. 
  Under current constitutional doctrine, co-religionist commercial 
agreements must be translated into secular terminology if they are to 
be judicially enforced. But many religious goods and services cannot 
be accurately translated without religious terms and structures. To 
address this translation problem, courts could make use of contextual 
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tools of contract interpretation, thereby providing the necessary 
evidence to give meaning to co-religionist commercial agreements. 
However, contextual approaches to co-religionist commerce have 
been undermined by two current legal trends—one in constitutional 
law, the other in commercial law. The first is New Formalism, which 
discourages courts from looking to customary norms and relational 
principles to interpret commercial instruments. The second is what we 
call Establishment Clause Creep, which describes a growing judicial 
reticence to adjudicate disputes situated within a religious context. 
Together, these two legal developments prevent courts from using 
context to interpret and enforce co-religionist commercial agreements. 
  This Article proposes that courts preserve co-religionist commerce 
with a limited embrace of contextualism. A thorough inquiry into 
context, which is discouraged by both New Formalist and many 
Establishment Clause doctrines, would allow courts to surmise 
parties’ intents and distinguish commercial from religious substance. 
Empowering the intent of co-religionist parties and limiting the 
doctrinal developments that threaten to undermine co-religionist 
commerce can secure marketplace dealings without intruding upon 
personal faith. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Though a rich tradition warns that mixing religion and money 
corrupts both,1 there is a great deal of “co-religionist commerce” in 
America—that is, commerce between co-religionists who intend their 
transactions to adhere to religious principles or to pursue religious 
objectives.2 Prominent examples of co-religionist commerce in the 
United States include a $4.6 billion Christian-products industry,3 a 
$12.5 billion kosher-food market,4 and a growing share of an $800 
billion global Sharia-compliant finance market.5 
In recent years, American religious communities have become 
increasingly sophisticated players in commercial markets, developing 
legal instruments that comply with the demands of religious dictates 
 
 1. Consider, as a historical and literary example, the following exchange between the 
farmer John Proctor and Reverend John Hale: 
Hale: I note that you are rarely in the church on Sabbath Day. . . . Will you tell me 
why you are so absent? . . . 
Proctor: I surely did come when I could, and when I could not I prayed in this house. 
Hale: Mr. Proctor, your house is not a church; your theology must tell you that. 
Proctor: It does, sir, it does; and it tells me that a minister may pray to God without 
he have golden candlesticks upon the altar. 
Hale: What golden candlesticks? 
Proctor: Since we built the church there were pewter candlesticks upon the altar; 
Francis Nurse made them, y’know, and a sweeter hand never touched the metal. But 
[Reverend] Parris came, and for twenty week he preach nothin’ but golden 
candlesticks until he had them. I labor the earth from dawn of day to blink of night, 
and I tell you true, when I look to heaven and see my money glaring at his elbows—it 
hurt my prayer, sir, it hurt my prayer. 
ARTHUR MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE 64–65 (Penguin Books 1981) (1952). 
 2. See, e.g., William P. Marshall & Douglas C. Blomgren, Regulating Religious 
Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 293, 315 (1986) (“[O]rganized 
religion represents an increasingly pervasive force in all elements of the society, including 
politics, commercial enterprise, and social welfare.”); Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in 
Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 912 (2009) (“In many—and perhaps an increasing 
number of—instances, religion overlaps with the commercial sphere and courts are obligated to 
determine whether or not to adopt an entirely hands-off approach simply because the specter of 
religion lurks on the horizon.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Jay Reeves, Some in $4.6B Christian Industry Copy Designs, Logos, USA 
TODAY, Dec. 18, 2009, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2009-12-18-christian-
copyright_N.htm; Christian Product Sales Put at $4 Billion Plus, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 2001, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jul/07/local/me-19488; see also Andrew Stone Mayo, Comment, 
For God and Money: The Place of the Megachurch Within the Bankruptcy Code, 27 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 609, 620–22 (2011) (describing the market for “quasi-religious products and 
services” and noting the existence of a $4.6 billion Christian-products industry).  
 4. See KOSHERFEST, KOSHER INDUSTRY FACTS, http://www.kosherfest.com/kosher-facts 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2015). 
 5. Scott R. Anderson, Recent Development: Forthcoming Changes in the Shari’ah 
Compliance Regime for Islamic Finance, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 237, 237 (2010). 
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while engineering substantial business transactions.6 Religious 
institutions have adopted employment agreements and arbitration 
systems that reflect substantive religious objectives,7 houses of 
worship have provided their constituents with a growing array of 
commercial services,8 and businesses have drafted increasingly 
 
 6. See, e.g., Martin M. Shenkman, Integrating Religious Considerations into Estate and 
Real Estate Planning, 22 PROB. & PROP. 34 (2008) (suggesting practical financial-structuring and 
contract-drafting adaptations to account for religious parties). 
 7. See, e.g., Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(affirming the dismissal of an employment discrimination suit by a music director on the 
grounds that the music director served a ministerial function within the church); Alicea-
Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming the dismissal 
of an employment discrimination suit by a press secretary on the grounds that the secretary 
served a ministerial function within the church); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Roman 
Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 802–03 (4th Cir. 2000) (affirming the dismissal of an 
employment discrimination suit by a music director on the grounds that the music director 
served a ministerial function within the church); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 
1999) (affirming the dismissal of an employment discrimination suit by a choir director on the 
grounds that the choir director served a ministerial function within the church); Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (dismissing the 
case on Establishment Clause grounds because a court evaluation of the professor’s 
qualifications to teach Canon law would be impermissibly intrusive); Scharon v. St. Luke’s 
Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming the dismissal of an 
employment discrimination suit by a former chaplain against a religious hospital in order to 
avoid excessive interference with religion in violation of the First Amendment); Nevius v. Afr. 
Inland Mission Int’l, 511 F. Supp. 2d 114, 120 (D.D.C. 2007) (dismissing a missionary’s 
discrimination claim against a missionary organization in order to avoid venturing into an 
“ecclesiastical dispute”); Ross v. Metro. Church of God, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 
2007) (dismissing a § 1981 claim by the director of the “worship arts” department against a 
church because the director’s function had been a ministerial one within the church); Hartwig v. 
Albertus Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203 (D. Conn. 2000) (dismissing claims by a 
professor at a Catholic college on Establishment Clause grounds to avoid becoming entangled 
in religious matters); El-Farra v. Sayyed, 226 S.W.3d 792, 795 (Ark. 2006) (affirming a summary 
judgment against an Islamic minister because resolution of his claims would involve deciding 
ecclesiastical issues); McEnroy v. St. Meinrad Sch. of Theology, 713 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1999) (affirming the dismissal of a seminary professor’s claims in order to avoid excessive 
entanglement in religious affairs); Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 2011-CA-000004-
MR, 2012 WL 3046472 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 426 S.W.3d 587 (Ky. 2014) (reversing a grant 
of summary judgment against a tenured professor for breach of contract claims against a 
seminary because the professor was not a ministerial employee of the seminary); Kirby v. 
Lexington Theological Seminary, 2010-CA-001798-MR, 2012 WL 3046352 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012), 
rev’d, 426 S.W.3d 597 (Ky. 2014) (reversing a grant of summary judgment against another 
seminary professor in materially similar circumstances); Fisher v. Congregation B’nai Yitzhok, 
110 A.2d 881, 883 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955) (affirming a ruling for a rabbi-cantor on a breach of 
contract case because the legal issue did not involve religious matters but rather the intent of the 
parties).  
 8. See, e.g., Bobby Allyn, Nashville Megachurch Appeals Tax Break Ruling over 
Bookstore, Cafe, THE TENNESSEAN, Nov. 15, 2012, http://www.tennessean.com/article/
20121115/NEWS06/311150008/Nashville-megachurch-appeals-tax-break-ruling-over-bookstore-
cafe (noting that Christ Church in Nashville, Tennessee, has “a gym, bookstore, and cafe on its 
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complex and creative legal documents to ensure compliance with 
religious standards. Co-religionist commerce is not just big business, it 
is also a sophisticated practice of law. And like any other modern 
industry, co-religionist commerce and its legal framework rely heavily 
on the formal legal support—enforcement of contracts, protection 
against torts, and adjudication of disputes—that is necessary to 
sustain all commercial arrangements. 
Because of its ecclesiastical qualities, however, co-religionist 
commerce presents an unusual challenge to American law. When 
commercial disputes arise among co-religionists, courts are asked—
for example, in determining the parties’ intents or customary norms—
to interpret religious terminology, standards, and practices.9 Courts 
therefore often shy away from adjudicating co-religionist commercial 
disputes, fearing that intervention would impermissibly contravene 
prevailing interpretations of the Establishment Clause.10 Yet courts 
also recognize that refusing to issue rulings both abdicates the judicial 
responsibility to resolve legal disputes11 and withdraws the legal 
 
property”); Jesse Bogan, America’s Biggest Megachurches, FORBES (June 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/26/americas-biggest-megachurches-business-megachurches.html 
(noting that the Second Baptist Church of Houston, Texas, has “fitness centers, bookstores, 
information desks, a café, a K-12 school, and free automotive repair service for single 
mothers”).  
 9. See, e.g., Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” Doctrine? Judicial 
Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 520 (2005) 
(collecting cases); Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493, 514–17 (2013) 
(same); Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional 
Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 259 n.115, 260 n.116 (2000) (same). 
 10. Although the reasons for this constitutional restriction vary, most scholarly treatments 
contend that the Establishment Clause erects structural or jurisdictional barriers to courts’ 
ability to interfere with the authority of religious institutions to govern religious life. See, e.g., 
Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 5–6, 75 (1998); Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious 
Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 851–52 (2009); Andrew 
Koppelman, The Troublesome Religious Roots of Religious Neutrality, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
865, 869 (2009); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes 
Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 120 (2007). 
 11. See In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1021, 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) 
(holding that the use of neutral principles of law to enforce a ketubah advanced the secular 
purposes of enabling parties to enter contracts and promoting the “amicable settlement of 
disputes that have arisen between parties to marriage”); cf. Ira Mark Ellman, Driven from the 
Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1378, 1382–83, 
1410–12 (1981) (emphasizing the burdens on religious institutions when courts refuse to 
embrace their traditional dispute-resolution function); Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Resolution of 
Property Disputes Among Religious Organizations, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 513, 515 (1990) (noting 
that “a strong policy favoring dispute settlement and the protection of civil interests mandates 
civil court intervention in [religious disputes]”). 
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infrastructure that is routinely available to—and necessary to 
support—secular commerce.12 Constitutional doctrine has long 
recognized this challenge and has instructed courts, when confronted 
with disputes that are imbued with ecclesiastical circumstances, to 
adjudicate on the basis of “neutral principles of law”—that is, to issue 
rulings based “on objective, well-established concepts of [] law 
familiar to lawyers and judges.”13 Relying on neutral principles of law 
allows courts to resolve disputes among co-religionists while avoiding 
“entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and 
practice.”14 
Unfortunately, the neutral-principles framework has proven less 
successful than participants in co-religionist commercial markets 
might have hoped. The core problem lies in a translation difficulty. 
Parties to co-religionist commercial agreements often lack the 
flexibility to replace religious terms in their agreements with secular 
terms, and therefore cannot contract around the Establishment 
Clause.15 For example, parties entering into purchase agreements for 
kosher food or into employment agreements for ministers seek a 
certain type of religious product or service that cannot be described 
without reference to religious requirements or religious standards. In 
other instances, co-religionist commercial agreements cannot be 
 
 12. Advocates of broader First Amendment protection for religious institutions have long 
worried that regulating religious institutions purely as commercial actors requires casting off 
religious commitments as the price of admission to the commercial and financial markets. See, 
e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Do For-Profit Businesses Have Free Exercise Rights?, 21 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 369, 397–99 (2013). These concerns might even provide good reason to rethink 
some widely held constitutional commitments, including constitutional objections to judicial 
resolution of religious questions. See generally, e.g., Helfand, supra note 9 (arguing that courts 
should not abstain from resolving disputes that turn on religious doctrine or practice when no 
other institution has authority to resolve the dispute). For other critiques of the religious 
question doctrine, see Goldstein, supra note 9, at 525–33 (providing examples of certain judicial 
determinations that necessarily involve religion and asserting that it is neither possible nor 
desirable to adopt an absolute prohibition on the “judicial assessment of religious questions”); 
Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Questions of 
Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 123 (1997) (examining the harms that 
may result from judicial unwillingness to inquire into religious practices in Establishment Clause 
cases). 
 13. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 11, at 1409–10 (arguing that the neutral-principles 
approach limits judicial inquiry in ways that undermine a court’s ability to reach a justifiable 
outcome); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious 
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1884–85 (1998) (worrying that the neutral-principles 
approach can lead to outcomes that “are likely to diverge from the actual understandings of 
those concerned”). 
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modified from their traditional form if they are to have their desired 
religious effect.16 For example, religious marriage contracts—such as 
the mahr in Muslim marriages17 or the ketubah in Jewish marriages18—
often assign financial commitments through the use of religious 
references. But assigning these obligations with purely secular 
terminology would undermine the religious significance of the 
marriage ceremony. 
This translation problem need not foreclose the possibility of 
predictable and enforceable co-religionist commercial transactions. 
Courts do, on occasion, embrace a contextual approach to 
understanding ecclesiastical terms within a neutral framework. This 
flexible interpretive approach can secure religious commercial 
transactions, even as it sometimes requires delving into customary 
norms to extract commercial substance from religious principles or 
permitting evidence from religious authorities to translate 
ecclesiastical terms into secular language. 
Employing contextualism as a response to the translation 
problem, however, has been stymied by two doctrinal 
developments—one in commercial law and the other in constitutional 
law. In commercial law, a subjective or contextual approach to 
understanding co-religionist commercial disputes has been 
discouraged by what private-law scholars have called New 
Formalism.19 New Formalism refers to trends in court decisions and 
legal scholarship that increasingly advocate textual interpretations of 
contracts between merchants. A reaction to Karl Llewellyn’s and the 
Uniform Commercial Code’s (UCC’s) embrace of business customs 
and general good-faith standards, New Formalism urges courts to 
refrain from inquiring into contextual elements—such as customary 
norms, notions of equity, and relational principles—when interpreting 
and enforcing contractual arrangements. In turn, New Formalism 
restricts courts from inquiring into the subjective intent of parties or 
extrinsic evidence that might inform the contracting environment 
between parties.20 Under such a New Formalist framework, courts 
 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
 17. See infra notes 109–19 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.  
 19. See, e.g., David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 842 
(1999). 
 20. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1807–08 (1996) (arguing that 
contextualist interpretation prevents parties from contracting according to their “preferred mix 
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cannot invoke contextual evidence to interpret religious terminology 
in co-religionist commercial agreements.21  
And in constitutional law, courts have exhibited a growing 
wariness of adjudicating disputes that involve, even tangentially, 
ecclesiastical interests. This has led to what this Article refers to as 
“Establishment Clause Creep,” a growing tendency by courts to 
interpret the Establishment Clause expansively to preclude 
adjudication of co-religionist disputes that, at their core, are 
commercial in nature. In such instances, courts conflate the 
commercial objectives of a transaction with the religious 
commitments of the parties,22 thereby undermining the core 
commitments of the neutral-principles approach to co-religionist 
commerce.23 When courts refuse to adjudicate co-religionist disputes, 
damages flowing from commercial fraud,24 professional defamation,25 
and contractual breach26 are left unremedied. 
 
of legal and extralegal terms” and deters them from “flexibly adjust[ing] their contracting 
relationships”); Charny, supra note 19, at 846–48 (observing that the new formalist rejects 
evidence of custom because of “the radical institutional and transactional specificity of 
transactional norms”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 587 (2003) (arguing that contextualist interpretation can 
create moral hazard). 
 21. See sources cited supra note 20. 
 22. Michael A. Helfand, Fighting for the Debtor’s Soul: Regulating Religious Commercial 
Conduct, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 159 (2011) (observing that courts often refuse to 
adjudicate certain religious cases due to “a hypersensitivity to entanglement concerns” with 
religion, not because of any “require[d] dismissal on Establishment Clause grounds”). 
 23. Given this trend, it is not surprising that the neutral-principles approach has been 
exposed to some significant criticism. Some have criticized the neutral-principles doctrine on the 
ground that it is insufficiently attentive to the sovereignty of religious institutions over their own 
religious matters. See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church 
Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1294–97 
(1980); Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 969 
(1991); John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of 
the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 863–68 (1984). Others have worried that the neutral-
principles doctrine requires courts to consider only the neutral features of the case—a tactic that 
may lead to errors in adjudicating disputes. See Ellman, supra note 11, at 1409–10 (criticizing the 
neutral-principles doctrine); Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 1881–1907 (arguing that although the 
neutral-principles approach has many advantages, it can in some cases lead courts to issue 
decisions that “may not match” the intentions of the parties).  
 24. In late 2012, this issue became the subject of litigation with allegations that Hebrew 
National failed to conform its meat to its advertised kosher standards. See Wallace v. ConAgra 
Foods, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. Minn. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, Wallace v. ConAgra 
Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2014); Tiffany Tsu, Suit Says Hebrew National Isn’t Kosher; 
ConAgra Says Without Merit, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/20/
business/la-fi-mo-hebrew-national-con-agra-20120620.  
HELFAND RICHMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2015  11:51 PM 
2015] CO-RELIGIONIST COMMERCE 777 
Together, New Formalism and Establishment Clause Creep form 
the Scylla and Charybdis of co-religionist commerce. On the one 
hand, New Formalism requires parties to use explicit language, but on 
the other hand, Establishment Clause Creep causes courts to 
withdraw whenever a dispute implicates, even tangentially, an 
ecclesiastic issue. Co-religionists are unable to characterize their 
dispute in either implied or explicit terms. 
The combination of these two doctrinal trends has denied co-
religionists the institutional support that is available to other 
merchants.27 The most significant result has been that co-religionists 
have had great difficulty drafting contracts that both accurately 
capture their commercial intent and contain language that is 
ultimately enforceable in court. But the doctrinal combination also 
exposes co-religionists to tortious economic harm because economic 
torts between co-religionists—including antitrust disputes—also 
involve a commingling of neutral principles with religious context. By 
removing the efficiencies typically gained by having courts secure 
contract and property rights and protect parties from tortious harm, 
these doctrinal developments generate substantial economic costs. 
And by imposing a unique economic burden on religious conduct, 
these developments also do injury to religious liberties. 
Indeed, these fundamental challenges to co-religionist commerce 
are even more concerning because co-religionist commerce is a 
growth industry.28 Continued globalization of commercial 
relationships29 and America’s changing demographics30 all but 
 
  This litigation is far from the first time that kosher standards have served as the 
foundation for a legal suit. See, e.g., Cohen v. Eisenberg, 19 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1940) (determining the plaintiff’s poultry trade to have been kosher, and in turn, finding the 
defendant’s public proclamation that the plaintiff’s poultry trade was not kosher to have been 
defamatory), aff’d, 24 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 1940).  
 25. Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203 (D. Conn. 2000); Abdelhak 
v. Jewish Press, 985 A.2d 197, 207–10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (finding that inquiry into 
the nexus between a defamatory statement and damages would require impermissible 
investigation of religious doctrine). 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.  
 29. Faisal Kutty, The Shari’a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration, 28 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 565, 565 (2006) (“In addition to issues in interpretation of commercial 
agreements and practices, differences in custom, language, culture, and religion continue to fuel 
conflicts and disagreements between commercial players.”). 
 30. Especially given the importance of Sharia-compliant finance to the global commercial 
markets, see Anderson, supra note 5, at 237, it is worth noting that some projections predict that 
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guarantee that co-religionist commerce will continue to represent a 
growing share of the nation’s economy. Moreover, these commercial 
trends are expanding at exactly the moment when tensions between 
religious exercise and commercial objectives stand at the center of 
some of the most foundational church–state debates in the United 
States. For example, the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Hosanna-
Tabor v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission31 ruled that the 
First Amendment shields religious institutions from liability under 
certain antidiscrimination laws.32 That same year, the Supreme Court 
of New Mexico imposed liability under the state’s public-
accommodations law on a photographer who, citing her religious 
commitments, refused to provide her professional photography 
services at a same-sex marriage.33 Perhaps most significantly, on the 
final day of the 2014–15 term, the Supreme Court held in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby34 that the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
affords protection to closely held for-profit corporations.35 
Consequently, certain religiously motivated corporations need not 
comply with the Affordable Care Act’s “contraception mandate”36 
 
the Muslim population in the United States will more than double in the next two decades. See 
The Future of the Global Muslim Population, PEW F. ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (Jan. 2011), 
available at http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_Affiliation/Muslim/
FutureGlobalMuslimPopulation-WebPDF-Feb10.pdf.  
 31. Hosanna-Tabor v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 32. See id. at 705 (noting uniform acceptance of the ministerial exception by federal courts 
of appeals). 
 33. See Robert K. Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good, 49 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 
293, 305 (2010) (quoting Chai Feldblum, a member of the EEOC, as saying, “If you run a 
wedding photography service, even if you don’t like the fact that those two ex-gays are getting 
married, you’d better have someone on your staff who will take those pictures.”); Robert K. 
Vischer, How Necessary is the Right of Assembly?, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1403, 1405 (2012) 
(critiquing the view “that the owners of Elane Photography can honor their consciences by 
keeping their moral beliefs out of the marketplace” because it “ignores the external orientation 
of conscience”); see generally ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: 
RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE (2010) (discussing the facts of the case 
generally and observing that “both sides in the Elane Photography case [could] wrap themselves 
in the mantle of conscience,” notwithstanding the outcome); Nadia N. Sawicki, The Hollow 
Promise of Freedom of Conscience, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1389, 1426 (2012) (noting that 
“[n]umerous business owners in California and elsewhere (including medical providers, 
websites, event venues, photographers, landlords, and civil servants) have refused to provide 
services to gay couples on the basis of moral objections to homosexuality,” and collecting 
relevant cases). 
 34. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 35. Id. at 2772–73. 
 36. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2015) (requiring employers that provide health insurance to 
include coverage for contraception and other related preventative care). 
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when doing so would violate the religious conscience of those who 
own the corporation.37 
All of these cases involve parties that both engage in commercial 
conduct and profess religious commitments, and they highlight how 
the unique statutory and constitutional treatment of religion can 
inadvertently undermine the security of voluntary commercial 
relationships. Therefore, viewing these cases in relation to co-
religionist commerce both reveals how impactful these cases can be 
on significant areas of commerce and suggests how critical it is for the 
law to be able to distinguish between the blurred categories of 
commerce and religion. 
This Article argues that courts should recognize the unique 
challenges of co-religionist commerce and should appreciate how the 
dual effects of New Formalism and Establishment Clause Creep 
contravene parties’ intents and undermine growing commercial 
markets. Part I focuses on the root of the legal conundrum by 
examining the “translation problem” and how it poses a unique 
challenge to the neutral-principles framework. Parts II and III then 
identify the emerging trends of New Formalism and Establishment 
Clause Creep and explain how they constitute a dual threat to co-
religionist commerce. Part IV then outlines a path for limited 
contextualism that can support co-religionist commerce while making 
better use of the neutral-principles doctrine and enabling parties to 
engage in the commercial dealings they desire. 
I.  THE TRANSLATION PROBLEM 
The neutral-principles framework was born out of the Supreme 
Court’s attempt to successfully navigate a complex balancing act.38 
The Court hoped to preserve the judiciary’s obligation to resolve 
disputes between co-religionists without impermissibly resolving 
religious questions.39 To navigate this delicate balance, the Court 
 
 37. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2772–73. 
 38. For some recent analysis of the neutral-principles framework, see Idleman, supra note 
9, at 259; Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms, 84 MINN. 
L. REV. 589, 607–11 (2000); Calvin Massey, Church Schisms, Church Property, and Civil 
Authority, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 23, 50 (2010); Brian Schmalzbach, Note, Confusion and 
Coercion in Church Property Litigation, 96 VA. L. REV. 443, 447, 450 (2010). 
 39. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (“The primary advantages of the neutral-
principles approach are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to 
accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity.”). 
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encouraged participants in co-religionist commercial markets to 
translate their agreements, replacing religious terminology with 
secular analogs. The Court emphasized, in the context of church-
property disputes, that “[s]tates, religious organizations, and 
individuals must structure relationships involving church property so 
as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.”40 
And more generally, the Court assured parties that their co-religionist 
commercial dealings would be supported and enforced so long as the 
questions presented would “rel[y] exclusively on objective, well-
established concepts of . . . law familiar to lawyers and judges.”41 
Thus, the Supreme Court committed itself to neutral principles 
of law presuming that parties can and would structure their legal 
dealings in secular language to avoid Establishment Clause 
problems.42 In this way, the neutral-principles framework leveraged 
what the Supreme Court called “the peculiar genius of private-law 
systems in general—flexibility in ordering private rights and 
obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties.”43 It relied on the 
dynamism of private law—and particularly of drafting contracts—that 
empowers parties to adjust to legal parameters and craft their 
dealings within the shadow of the law.44 This presumption—that 
 
  Scholars continue to debate the precise Establishment Clause worry implicated when 
courts resolve religious questions. See Esbeck, supra note 10, at 5–6 (arguing that the 
Establishment Clause creates a structural restraint on courts, which divests them of jurisdiction 
to resolve religious questions); Garnett, supra note 10, at 862–63 (linking the prohibition against 
judicial resolution of religious questions to the autonomy of religious institutions); Koppelman, 
supra note 10, at 883 (arguing that judicial intervention in religious questions corrupts religion); 
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 122–23 (arguing that courts are adjudicatively disabled from 
resolving religious questions). But see Helfand, supra note 9, at 520 (arguing that the religious 
question doctrine stems from a misunderstanding of Establishment Clause principles). 
 40. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 
 41. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603. 
 42. Id. (“Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious societies 
can specify what is to happen to church property in the event of a particular contingency, or 
what religious body will determine the ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal 
controversy.”). 
 43. Id.  
 44. See Melvin Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
1743, 1762 (2000) (discussing how contract-law principles have responded to the multifaceted 
and “moving stream of events that precedes, follows, or constitutes the formation of a 
contract”); Nancy S. Kim, Evolving Business and Social Norms and Interpretation Rules: The 
Need for A Dynamic Approach to Contract Disputes, 84 NEB. L. REV. 506, 531 (2005) 
(commenting on how contract-law objectives demand consideration of the evolving business 
and social norms and needs that underlie the formation of contracts shaped by regional, 
cultural, and linguistic assumptions between parties). 
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parties can deftly respond to doctrinal constraints45—stands at the 
very epicenter of the Supreme Court’s neutral-principles project46 and 
sustains the belief that courts can remain true to First Amendment 
values without abdicating their foundational dispute-resolution 
responsibilities.47 
 
 45. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1506 (1998) (discussing how parties will adapt their 
behavior to changing rules of law in accordance with their economic priorities); Ariel Porat, 
Enforcing Contracts in Dysfunctional Legal Systems: The Close Relationship Between Public and 
Private Orders, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2459, 2465–66, 2478 (2000) (noting that the formation of 
contracts will reflect the conditions of the public order, including the courts’ rules of contract 
interpretation); Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial 
Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 771 (2000); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of 
Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1584 (2005) (discussing the implications of how 
different modes of contract interpretation will move parties to responsively negotiate contract 
terms in a manner that maximizes their own economic interests). 
 46. See, e.g., Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603 (“Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust 
provisions, religious societies can specify what is to happen to church property in the event of a 
particular contingency, or what religious body will determine the ownership in the event of a 
schism or doctrinal controversy.”); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (“Hence, States, religious organizations, 
and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the 
civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.”).  
 47. See Perry Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1715, 1743 (noting that 
the neutral-principles approach is contingent on “whether private ordering through instruments 
such as deeds and trusts can in particular instances effectively translate religious principles into 
enforceable secular norms”); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular 
and Alien Institutions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 357 (1986) (“[The neutral-principles 
approach] assumes that the church has translated into familiar secular terminology its 
organizational characteristics, no matter how secular or alien they may be.”).  
  To be sure, scholars have vigorously debated the utility of the neutral-principles 
approach ever since the Court announced its decision in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). For 
some, the notion that courts would now be given free entry into the life of religious 
institutions—free to regulate so long as they could avoid engaging religious doctrine or 
practice—undermined the core commitment to religious institutional freedom expressed in 
many of the Supreme Court’s prior decisions. See Dane, supra note 23, at 969 (“The problem 
with [the neutral-principles approach] . . . is that it too denies the collective, self-defining 
character of true legal orders. It treats religious autonomy as a negative freedom—the right not 
to have secular courts decide religious orthodoxy. But it ignores the positive side of autonomy, 
the right to define, and to enforce, legal rubrics and rights apart from those provided by the 
secular state.”).  
  Meanwhile, others worried that there would be something lost in the translation of 
religious commitments into secular terminology, raising the possibility that courts might 
misinterpret the nature of the intended legal obligations between the parties. See, e.g., Ellman, 
supra note 11, at 1409–10 (arguing that the neutral-principles approach limits judicial inquiry in 
ways that undermine a court’s ability to reach a justifiable outcome); Greenawalt, supra note 15, 
at 1884–85 (1998) (worrying that the neutral-principles approach can lead to outcomes that “are 
likely to diverge from the actual understandings of those concerned”).  
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Many religious objectives cannot be captured in alternative 
secular terminology, however, and thus many co-religionist 
commercial instruments resist translation.48 One reason for this 
“translation problem” is that parties enter co-religionist commercial 
arrangements to purchase religious goods or secure religious 
performance, but these religious goods and services are often not 
susceptible to description in secular terminology. Frequent examples 
include the contractual obligations of a minister,49 or the religious 
standards for supervising kosher products.50 In drafting such 
agreements, parties aim to create commercial or financial 
arrangements that will comport with shared religious rules and values. 
Reference to specific religious terms is essential to the agreement. To 
use the above examples, a party seeking to ensure that he is 
purchasing kosher food cannot translate that requirement into secular 
terminology;51 and a congregation that retains the contractual right to 
terminate a minister for “cause” cannot incorporate secular 
terminology that captures the religious standards of conduct expected 
within the given religious community.52 Such contractual expectations 
are not just too multifarious to be contractually memorialized, but 
they incorporate by reference religious rules and values that are 
inherently religious and therefore lack secular analogs.53  
 
 48. See Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 1881–1907 (arguing that although the neutral-
principles approach has many advantages, it can in some cases lead courts to issue decisions that 
“may not match” the intentions of the parties). 
 49. See, e.g., Kraft v. Rector, Churchwardens & Vestry of Grace Church, No. 01-CV-7871, 
2004 WL 540327, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2004) (holding that the court could not decide 
whether the plaintiff was rightfully terminated for cause, as such a determination would run 
afoul of First Amendment considerations); El-Farra v. Sayyed, 226 S.W.3d 792, 793 (Ark. 2006) 
(dismissing an imam’s breach-of-employment-contract claim for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction because the cause for termination included claims that the imam’s “misconduct 
‘contradicts the Islamic law’”). 
 50. See, e.g., Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 419 (2d Cir. 
2002) (considering the constitutionality of the state’s “kosher law”); Barghout v. Mayor of 
Baltimore, 833 F. Supp. 540, 542 (D. Md. 1993) (same); Ran-Dav’s Cnty. Kosher, Inc. v. State, 
608 A.2d 1353, 1355 (N.J. 1992) (same). 
 51. See cases cited supra note 49. 
 52. See Wallace v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 995, 999–1000 (D. Minn. 2013) 
(dismissing a lawsuit claiming the defendant falsely advertised its food was “100% kosher” 
because resolving the dispute would violate First Amendment principles), rev’d on other 
grounds, Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025, 1033 (8th Cir. 2014); see also cases 
cited supra note 50.  
 53. See Sirico, supra note 47, at 357 (criticizing the neutral-principles approach “because it 
assumes that selectively culled provisions accurately reflect the expectations of the parties [and] 
. . . thus permits dispute resolution only by positing an artificial formalism on the church’s 
part”). 
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A second reason parties to co-religionist commercial agreements 
lack the ability to modify their agreements is that their religious 
traditions and doctrines place formal restrictions on the structure and 
terms of the relevant documents.54 Examples of this dynamic arise 
regularly in the family-law context, particularly in cases of marriage 
and divorce. Within Jewish55 and Islamic56 communities, traditional 
 
  One way to address this issue might be to increase the use of religious arbitration. Once 
a co-religionist commercial dispute is submitted to a religious-arbitration tribunal, the 
arbitrators could resolve the dispute by exploring religious questions, given that there is no 
constitutional prohibition against arbitrators investigating such religious questions. See Helfand, 
supra note 9, at 506–09 (describing the gap-filling role of religious arbitration). Although 
religious arbitration mitigates this translation problem somewhat because the arbitrators can 
interpret and enforce religious terminology, it is an insufficient mechanism to solve the problem 
for a number of reasons. First, not all religious communities have access to religious-arbitration 
tribunals capable of addressing complex claims of co-religionist commerce. See, e.g., Michael A. 
Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal 
Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1249–52 (2011) (discussing the lag in the development of 
Islamic arbitration tribunals in the United States). Second, and relatedly, even when a religious 
community maintains religious tribunals, not all members of the religious community will have 
access to religious tribunals that align with their own denominational and theological 
affiliations. And third, courts sometimes refuse to enforce arbitration provisions that attempt to 
authorize religious tribunals to resolve a dispute precisely because they use religious 
terminology to ensure that the forum selected and law chosen will track the intentions of the 
parties. See, e.g., Sieger v. Sieger, 747 N.Y.S.2d 102, 104 (App. Div. 2002) (refusing on First 
Amendment grounds to enforce a purported arbitration provision that required a dispute to be 
resolved “in accordance with the ‘regulations of Speyer, Worms, and Mainz’”); In re Ismailoff, 
14 Misc. 3d 1229(A) (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Feb. 1, 2007) (refusing to enforce an arbitration provision 
that required the selection of “three persons of the Orthodox Jewish faith”). 
 54. See infra Part II.B. 
 55. See, e.g., Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d 899, 902 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); In re Scholl, 621 A.2d 
808, 811 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1992); Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523, 524 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1996); Mayer-Kolker v. Kolker, 819 A.2d 17, 18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); Minkin v. 
Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 668 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981); see generally Alan C. Lazerow, Give 
and “Get”? Applying the Restatement of Contracts to Determine the Enforceability of Get 
Settlement Contracts, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 103 (2009) (discussing the nature and enforceability of 
Jewish bill-of-divorce contracts).  
 56. Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); see also Soleimani 
v. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668 (Dist. Ct. Kan. Aug. 28, 2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/
wp-content/uploads/2012/09/soleimani.pdf (discussing Establishment Clause concerns 
preventing the interpretation of a mahr agreement); Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 490–91 
(Md. 2008); Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000, 1002 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1978); Zawahiri 
v. Alwattar, No. 07AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *5–6 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008); Ahmad v. 
Ahmad, No. L-00-1391, 2001 WL 1518116, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001).  
  This apparent increase in mahr cases has also spawned a number of recent articles. See, 
e.g., Nathan B. Oman, Bargaining in the Shadow of God’s Law: Islamic Mahr Contracts and the 
Perils of Legal Specialization, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579, 580 (2010) [hereinafter Oman, 
Bargaining]; Nathan B. Oman, How to Judge Shari’a Contracts: A Guide to Islamic Marriage 
Agreements in American Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 287, 290 (2011) [hereinafter Oman, How to 
Judge]; Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Note, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts: 
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marriage ceremonies require the couple not only to execute religious 
documents that have important symbolic and religious value, but also 
to include provisions in those documents that assign financial 
obligations between the couple.57 Some couples may, of course, fully 
understand and embrace both the symbolic and financial aspects of 
these agreements; others may sign them simply to conform to 
longstanding family traditions.58 But the limitations placed by 
religious doctrine on the form and substance of these documents 
prevent the parties from ensuring that the terms of their co-religionist 
commercial agreements reflect the precise intentions of the parties. 
The inherent obstacles to translating religious obligations into 
secular terminology have long served as a fundamental critique to the 
Supreme Court’s neutral-principles approach.59 The doctrine 
presumes that religious parties can incorporate purely ecclesiastical 
customs, words, and documents into neutral language. Put another 
way, it presumes that parties can use secular language to represent 
religious intents that are beyond what is apparent to the objective 
observer. Thus, the neutral-principles approach presents a classic 
challenge in legal interpretation, pitting objective methods against 
subjective intents. 
This inherent disconnect between the parties’ subjective 
intentions and the need to use secular language causes predictable 
problems. Factfinders, for example, are likely to make interpretation 
errors, either perceiving an instrument that represents symbolic and 
ecclesiastical value to be purely commercial, or interpreting 
intentionally commercial terms to have unintended ecclesiastical 
meaning. As a result, these translation challenges are more than mere 
inconveniences, as they strike at core features of interpretation. They 
pose a direct challenge to the motivation underlying the neutral-
principles approach, which the Supreme Court designed so that courts 
 
Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptuals and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 189, 191 (2002); Charles P. Trumbull, Note, Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for 
Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 609, 611 (2006).  
 57. See Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family Law, 63 
MD. L. REV. 540, 540 (2004); see generally MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL 
CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION 
(Joel Nichols ed., 2012) (discussing the intersection of religion and civil society in marriage). 
 58. See, e.g., In re the Marriage of Obaidi, 226 P.3d 787, 791 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
 59. See supra notes 47–48. 
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can interpret and enforce co-religionist commercial agreements to 
“reflect the intentions of the parties.”60 
One way to avoid the translation problem is to take the Supreme 
Court at its word and, irrespective of interpretive canons, place a 
greater primacy on determining the “intentions of the parties.”61 
Instead of interpreting co-religionist commercial agreements 
textually, courts can take a contextual approach and place a greater 
primacy on divining parties’ intents. This would involve adopting 
permissive rules on parol and extrinsic evidence, emphasizing course 
of dealing and customary norms, and seeking subjective intents rather 
than objective manifestations. Thus, instead of trying to determine—
as an objective matter—what the word “kosher” means in a consumer 
contract or how to define “cause” in an employment agreement with 
a house of worship, courts could interpret such terms by trying to 
determine what the parties intended for the provisions to mean or 
how those words are understood in a particular commercial industry. 
Similarly, when faced with traditional religious agreements—such as 
religious marriage contracts—in which religious doctrine prevents 
parties from tinkering with the customary terms, courts could 
interpret the agreement with reference to the subjective intent of the 
parties and other contextual considerations. Doing so would align 
contract enforcement with the intentions of the parties, thereby 
fulfilling the overall purpose of the neutral-principles approach to co-
religionist commerce, while still avoiding any need to delve into 
ecclesiastical matters.62 Unfortunately, two doctrinal trends—one in 
commercial law, the other in constitutional law—are making 
contextual interpretation increasingly difficult. Developments in 
commercial law encourage courts to limit the use of contextual and 
parol evidence, thereby reducing parties’ ability to explain the intents 
behind secular language. Yet developments in Establishment Clause 
cases have expanded what courts consider to be ecclesiastical, and 
thereby have reduced parties’ ability to codify their intentions in 
writing. The combination limits ex ante what co-religionists can write 
into an agreement, and ex post how co-religionists can actualize their 
intentions. 
 
 60. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See infra Part IV. 
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II.  NEW FORMALISM 
One appropriate judicial response to the challenges of 
interpreting co-religionist commercial instruments would be to focus 
not on the content of religious doctrine, but on the intentions of the 
parties.63 As long as courts avoid defining religious terms or 
interpreting religious doctrine, they can circumvent Establishment 
Clause prohibitions.64 In turn, by marshaling the variety of contract 
doctrines that focus not on religious doctrine, but on the contracting 
context, courts can leverage doctrinal tools that avoid the pitfalls of 
the Establishment Clause while still interpreting and enforcing co-
religionist commercial instruments that incorporate religious 
terminology.65 
The growing influence of New Formalism—which now enjoys 
strong scholarly and judicial support66—has limited courts’ use of 
these doctrines for permissive interpretation. New Formalism has 
been described as “anti-antiformalism,” since it is a reaction to, and is 
intended as a correction to, the realist jurisprudence that wrested 
contract law from the formalism that defined it under Williston and 
other early twentieth-century jurists.67 Realists, led by Karl Llewellyn, 
deigned to shape contract law in the mid-to-late twentieth century to 
incorporate the nascent rules embedded in the customs and practices 
of commercial parties.68 The court’s job was to “look for the law in 
life” and then incorporate an “immanent law” into contractual 
 
 63. Cf. Ellman, supra note 11, at 1416 (“What the courts needed to decide in the synagogue 
cases was not the essence of Judaism, an unconstitutional if not impossible task, but rather the 
essence of the grantor’s intent. The courts ought to have determined whether the language of 
the trust instrument by which the grantor conditioned his gift should have been construed, 
under normal rules of interpretation, to bar mixed seating.”). 
 64. For sources discussing these Establishment Clause prohibitions, see supra note 9. 
 65. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603–04. 
 66. For a theoretical defense and empirical support for the rise of New Formalism, see 
generally Robert Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847 
(2000). 
 67. See Charny, supra note 19, at 842–43; Mark L. Movsesian, Formalism in American 
Contract Law: Classical and Contemporary, 12 IUS GENTIUM 115, 116 (2006); Robert E. Scott, 
The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 379–80 (2004). 
 68. See, e.g., Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 626 (1975); Scott, supra note 66, at 871–72; Charny, supra note 19, 
at 842–43; see also Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s 
Attempt to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 
1151–60 (1985) (“The rules incorporate actual business practices, however, only to the extent 
that such practice comported with Llewellyn’s view of sound and reasonable commercial 
conduct.”). 
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disputes.69 Adjudicating under Llewellyn’s realism—and the UCC 
that Llewellyn crafted—therefore required the costly tasks of 
understanding the contracting environment and discovering the 
immanent norms surrounding each case, such as the subjective intent 
of the parties, the parties’ course of dealing, and the given industry’s 
standards.70 
New Formalism, primarily motivated by reducing the costs of 
contracting, squarely aims at reintroducing formalism into contract 
law. But unlike the formalism of the early twentieth century, in which 
traditional legal definitions and logic dictated contract law,71 New 
Formalism is motivated by a desire to convey predictable outcomes to 
contracting parties should a dispute spill over into court.72 New 
 
 69. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 122 
(1960); Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A 
Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999); Danzig, supra note 68, at 635.  
 70. See James W. Bowers, Incomplete Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 1229, 1273 (2002); Zipporah B. 
Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 
504–05 (1987). 
 71. See C. C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 4–5 (Little, Brown, & 
Co. 1880); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon 
Fuller’s “Consideration and Form”, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 106 (2000); Movsesian, supra note 
67, at 121; see also Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605–10 
(1908) (describing the early twentieth-century legal order as a “scientific legal system” 
threatening to become “a mechanical jurisprudence” of logical deductions from traditional 
rules). 
  Earlier classicists generally understood the legal order as a logical weaving of rules into 
a harmonious, rational, gapless whole—emphasizing a conceptual and abstract essentialism. See 
Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 109 PENN ST. 
L. REV. 397, 405 (2004) (citing CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS (Little, Brown, & Co. 1871)) (characterizing late nineteenth to early 
twentieth-century formalism as trying to “systematiz[e] the great body of common law cases 
along a modest number of general principles”).  
 72. See Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
473, 497–98 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 636, 644 (1999); see, e.g., Glenn S. Koppel, The Functional and Dysfunctional Role of 
Formalism in Federalism: Shady Grove Versus Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 907 
(2012) (“This Article’s thesis is that formalism can be justified . . . in functional terms such as 
enhancing predictability.”); Posner, supra note 45, at 752–53 (noting that while literal contract 
enforcement can produce error, “at least this error would be predictable”); Schwartz, supra note 
20, at 618 (arguing that firms prefer the state “to enforce the contracts they write,” because they 
prefer adjudicators to be more accurate on average rather than perfect in every instance); Scott, 
supra note 66, at 859–60 (arguing that “[i]f correct interpretation is indeed an important value 
and if this requires interpretation that is transparent and predictable,” then a formalist approach 
is better); Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 823, 844–45 (2000) (observing the common suggestion that courts “should 
engage in a literalistic interpretation of verifiable terms to preserve the value of predictable 
interpretation and advance standardization”). 
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Formalism therefore relies on bright-line rules over standards, textual 
interpretation over either contextual approaches or permissive rules 
on allowing extrinsic evidence to explain ambiguous language, and 
penalty rules on the definiteness requirement over encouraging courts 
to fill contractual gaps.73 The logic of New Formalism is that 
predictable and inexpensive court interventions—even interventions 
that are unlikely to accurately implement what the parties originally 
intended—would be mutually preferred ex ante by contracting 
parties, especially parties likely to engage in multiple contractual 
relations.74 If outcomes are easily foreseen, then costly litigation can 
be avoided. Meanwhile, drafting errors are simply corrected in 
subsequent contracts, and social norms and extralegal enforcement 
stabilize ongoing contracting relations without court intrusion.75 
On one level, New Formalism is well suited to cater to parties, 
like co-religionists, who engage in repeat transactions, have shared 
norms that are more familiar to the parties than to any adjudicating 
factfinder, and frequently use nonlegal norms to supplement legal 
penalties.76 However, at its core, the central doctrines in New 
Formalism presume that parties can adapt their commercial 
agreements to account for problematic legal doctrines—a 
presumption that often does not hold true for co-religionist 
 
 73. See Charny, supra note 19, at 849 (noting that with gap-filling, “formalism has 
particular appeal because there is a readily available device” to resolve them: to infer consent to 
the gap “from the voluntary decision to enter into the transaction”); Schwartz, supra note 20, at 
618–19 (arguing for the implementation of a New Formalist–type approach); cf. Lisa Bernstein, 
Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, 
and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1735–44 (2001) (exploring the extent to which private 
legal systems can supply New Formalist approaches over courts’ gap-filling procedures). 
 74. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect 
World: What To Do When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete 
Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 323, 326 (2004) (“[T]he new formalists[’] . . . approach suggests 
that while ex ante there is uncertainty about the future state of the world, . . . courts should be 
modest about intervening.”); Scott, supra note 66, at 851 (asserting that a formalist approach 
“require[s] the parties expressly to signal ex ante their preference for more aggressive modes of 
interpretation of the contract terms”).  
 75. See Bernstein, supra note 73, at 1741–42; Scott, supra note 66, at 848. 
 76. See Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New Formalism, 6 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 5–6 (2009) (“This model predicts that the less contextual rules endorsed 
by the New Formalists are likely to be preferred where transactions are frequent and 
certain . . . .”); David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 375, 429 (1990) (asserting that for rational parties who prefer nonlegal resolutions, 
formalism “would minimize drafting costs”); Helfand, Religious Arbitration, supra note 53, at 
1243–51 (2011) (exploring the use of arbitration to resolve disputes within religious 
communities); Speidel, supra note 72, at 844. 
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commerce. Thus, because parties to co-religionist commercial 
agreements often cannot avoid the consequences of the 
Establishment Clause, a court’s failure to employ antiformalist 
interpretive tactics—such as inquiring into the parties’ shared 
subjective intent and relational history—withholds from the 
factfinder information that is essential to understand the dispute. 
These antiformalist interpretive methods are crucial to the viability of 
co-religionist commerce precisely because of certain Establishment 
Clause prohibitions against judicial resolution of religious questions. 
Thus, the Establishment Clause prohibits courts from using objective 
methods to interpret co-religionist commercial agreements, whereas 
New Formalism forecloses using subjective and contextual methods 
of interpretation as an alternative. 
Below we consider two types of problems posed by New 
Formalism to co-religionist commerce: First, formalism can prevent 
courts from interpreting and enforcing contracts for religious goods 
and services. Second, courts sometimes misapprehend the contractual 
intent of the parties to traditional religious contracts. In both 
instances, parties to co-religionist commerce cannot translate their 
agreements into secular terminology. And New Formalism—in its 
refusal to use contextual evidence to surmise the parties’ intents—
distorts co-religionist commerce in deeply troublesome ways, 
preventing parties from crafting financial instruments that achieve 
both commercial and religious objectives. 
A. Religious Goods and Services 
The sale of religious goods and services stands as one of the 
paradigmatic forms of co-religionist commerce.77 Producers of 
religious goods and services advertise, market, and sell to clientele 
specifically interested in the religious nature of these goods and 
services.78 In so doing, these producers often employ religious 
 
 77. Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The Change in Everyday Religious Practice and 
Its Importance to the Law, 51 BUFFALO L. REV. 127, 180–83 (2003); see generally R. LAURENCE 
MOORE, SELLING GOD: AMERICAN RELIGION IN THE MARKETPLACE OF CULTURE (1994) 
(recounting the commercialization of religious goods and services since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century). 
 78. See, e.g., Mayo, supra note 3, at 620–22 (describing the market for “quasi-religious 
products and services” and noting the $4.6 billion Christian-products industry). For some 
examples of companies marketing Christian goods and services, see Christian Retailing, 
CHRISTIAN RETAILING, http://www.christianretailing.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2015), and Faith 
Centered Resources, FAITH CENTERED RESOURCES, http://www.faithcenteredresources.com 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2015). 
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terminology to describe their goods and services to attract the interest 
and earn the trust of prospective purchasers. But the success of such 
co-religionist markets is predicated on the ability of courts to 
interpret, enforce, and otherwise hold participants accountable in 
these co-religionist markets when they employ religious terminology 
to market and sell religious goods and services. Because parties 
cannot always adequately describe the religious goods and services in 
secular terminology, courts often abstain from interpreting co-
religionist agreements so as to avoid running afoul of the 
Establishment Clause. And a purely formalist approach to 
interpreting religious terminology prevents courts from using 
contextual evidence to uncover the parties’ shared understandings. 
For example, consider the recently dismissed class-action lawsuit 
against ConAgra, the parent corporation of the Hebrew National 
brand.79 According to a complaint filed in 2012, ConAgra advertises 
and sells meat products under the Hebrew National label, describing 
them as “100% kosher” “as defined by the most stringent Jews who 
follow Orthodox Jewish law.”80 The plaintiffs contended, however, 
that contrary to these representations, Hebrew National meat 
products did not satisfy these kosher standards.81 As a result, 
purchasers of Hebrew National meat products allegedly overpaid for 
these products, mistakenly believing them to be “100% kosher.”82 
And having misrepresented the kosher quality of these meat 
products, the plaintiffs claimed that ConAgra should be held liable 
 
 79. Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1000 (D. Minn. 2013), vacated 
and remanded, 747 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2014). The dismissal by the District Court of Minnesota 
was subsequently reversed on other grounds by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit. Wallace, 747 F.3d at 1033. According to the Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs failed to 
plead injury in an individualized or particular manner, thereby failing to demonstrate standing 
to bring the suit. Id. at 1028. The Court of Appeals thereby avoided addressing the 
Establishment Clause question at the heart of the case. Because the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing, however, it remanded the case back to state court. 
Id. at 1032. And on remand, the District Court of Minnesota dismissed the action on First 
Amendment grounds, paralleling the same analysis employed by the federal district court. See 
Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 19HA-CV-12-3237, at 10–17 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 3, 2014), 
available at http://failedmessiah.typepad.com/files/suit-against-hebrew-national-dismissed-10-6-
2014.pdf.  
 80. Class Action Complaint at 3, Wallace, 920 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. Minn. June 6, 2012) (No. 
0:12-cv-1354).  
 81. Id. at 17–21. 
 82. Id. at 64. 
HELFAND RICHMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2015  11:51 PM 
2015] CO-RELIGIONIST COMMERCE 791 
for damages for breach of contract, negligence, and violation of 
various consumer-protection laws.83 
The Hebrew National litigation was far from the first time 
questions over the meaning of “kosher” made their way into U.S. 
courts.84 A number of states had attempted to incorporate definitions 
of kosher into consumer protection legislation, only to have such 
legislation struck down as violating the Establishment Clause.85 The 
District Court of Minnesota similarly dismissed the Hebrew National 
lawsuit, concluding—as prior courts had when scrutinizing consumer-
fraud legislation that regulated the labeling of kosher food—that 
“[t]he definition of the word ‘kosher’ is intrinsically religious in 
nature, and this Court may not entertain a lawsuit that will require it 
to evaluate the veracity of Defendant’s representations that its 
Hebrew National products meet any such religious standard.”86 
But, by conflating the Hebrew National lawsuit with litigation 
over kosher legislation, the court missed the fundamental difference 
between the two. Kosher legislation raised Establishment Clause 
concerns because it entailed governmental endorsement of a 
particular definition of the term “kosher.”87 By contrast, the Hebrew 
National lawsuit avoided these Establishment Clause concerns 
because it involved private plaintiffs who simply alleged that the 
defendant had mislabeled its product. 
This key difference presented the district court with an 
opportunity to allow the suit to go forward. For, instead of delving 
into the objective meaning of the word “kosher,” the court could have 
used contextual evidence to evaluate whether the parties had a shared 
understanding of what “kosher” meant. By shifting its focus from the 
objective meaning of “kosher” to the subjective understanding of the 
parties, the court therefore could have focused on the central and 
meaningful question of whether Hebrew National’s labeling was 
 
 83. Id. at 1–6. 
 84. See cases cited supra note 50. 
 85. See Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.5 (4th 
Cir. 1995) (listing twenty-one states that have adopted such laws). For a discussion of the 
constitutionality of these laws, see Kent Greenawalt, Religious and Civil Law: Using Secular 
Law to Assure Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 785–
810 (1998). 
 86. Wallace, 920 F. Supp. at 999. 
 87. The plaintiffs emphasized this point in their briefing. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of 
Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 33–35, Wallace, 920 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. 
Minn. Oct. 1, 2012) (No. 0:12-cv-1354).  
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misleading without running afoul of Establishment Clause 
prohibitions. 
Indeed, Hebrew National had provided some of that context in 
its advertising by specifically referencing “Orthodox” standards of 
kosher.88 Hebrew National’s advertising campaign may have intended 
those terms to convey a particular representation to potential 
consumers. Thus, interrogating the subjective intent of the parties 
might have yielded a shared interpretation of the term that could 
have been employed to evaluate whether or not the advertising 
constituted either false advertising or a breach of contract. 
Moreover, the court might have used contextual evidence to 
evaluate Hebrew National’s “kosher” representations in light of 
various aids of interpretation. It could have considered the 
consistency of Hebrew National’s implementation of its kosher 
standards under the course-of-dealing rubric for contract 
interpretation89—a point made by the plaintiffs in their brief on the 
motion to dismiss.90 And, maybe most materially, the court might 
have considered the commercial standards for kosher certification, 
which had become relatively uniform as a result of various market 
pressures.91 
The district court’s failure to approach the Hebrew National 
lawsuit through a contextual lens highlights how the case is not simply 
about judicial interpretation of the Establishment Clause, but is more 
fundamentally about judicial refusal to consider context when 
interpreting private agreements. Such an outcome is fairly typical of 
how New Formalism constrains a court’s ability to parse private 
agreements between parties. The court assumed that the only method 
for adjudicating the plaintiffs’ claims was to provide an objective 
interpretation of “kosher” based solely on the formal text of its 
commercial representations. But a contextual approach could have 
provided methods for interpreting the term “kosher” that did not 
 
 88. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 80, at *3. 
 89. TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, KOSHER: PRIVATE REGULATION IN THE AGE OF INDUSTRIAL 
FOOD 81–84 (2013) (describing why the kosher certification adopted by Hebrew National has 
become an industry outsider). 
 90. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for 
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 16, Wallace, 920 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2012) 
(No. 0:12-cv-1354).  
 91. For the commercial reasons for uniformity of standards in the kosher-certification 
market, see LYTTON, supra note 89, at 132–34 (explaining how the interdependence of the 
kosher-certification market has led to the creation of increasingly uniform certification 
standards). 
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require becoming enmeshed in religious doctrine. A contextual 
approach could have provided an equally useful answer to a slightly 
different question: Did the parties have a shared understanding of the 
term kosher? 
The Hebrew National lawsuit is essentially about the interpretive 
constraints of New Formalism. When contextual interpretive tools are 
taken off the table, however, courts face the false dilemma of 
dismissing co-religionist commercial claims or delving into the 
objective meaning of religious terminology. To be sure, the use of 
contextual evidence—such as subjective intent, course of dealing, 
course of performance, and trade usage—might have been 
insufficient to determine whether Hebrew National could be held 
liable for consumer-protection fraud or breach of contract. But a 
categorical embrace of New Formalism prevents courts from even 
exploring this opportunity. 
The challenge posed by New Formalism to co-religionist 
commerce also arises when parties seek to incorporate adherence to 
religious rules or doctrine as part of their commercial exchange. In 
Katz v. Singerman,92 for example, the court considered whether to 
enjoin a synagogue from allowing mixed seating (that is, permitting 
men and women to sit together) on the grounds that it would violate 
conditions placed by the grantor who donated the building.93 The 
grantor, Benjamin Rosenberg, had donated property to the Chevra 
Thilim Congregation on the condition that, among other things, the 
building would “only be used as a place of Jewish worship according 
to the strict ancient and orthodox forms and ceremonies.”94 The 
congregation’s board of directors accepted the donation from 
Rosenberg on the specific condition that, among other things, the 
building would be used “for the worship of God according to the 
Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual.”95 When the congregation considered 
passing a resolution to permit mixed seating, the plaintiffs sought an 
injunction, arguing that such a practice would fail to qualify as 
“worship according to the strict ancient and orthodox forms” and 
 
 92. Katz v. Singerman, 127 So. 2d 515 (La. 1961). 
 93. Id. at 515. 
 94. Id. at 517. 
 95. Id. at 518. 
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“Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual,” and thus would violate the 
conditions of the donation.96 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana, however, refused to enjoin the 
resolution, concluding that its conditions were insufficiently definite, 
clear, or specific.97 In reaching this conclusion, the court’s focus was 
first and foremost formalistic, focusing its inquiry on the objective 
meaning and content of “Orthodox Judaism.” The court considered 
conflicting expert testimony over whether Orthodox Judaism 
permitted mixed seating at services,98 and on this record, it concluded 
that the formal meaning of the conditions provided insufficient 
guidance to permit judicial enforcement of the terms.99 
To be sure, the court in Katz did—at least for a moment—
consider mining antiformalist resources to interpret the term 
“Orthodox Judaism” by considering what the grantor himself actually 
meant when employing the phrase “Orthodox Judaism.”100 But instead 
of engaging in a contextualist inquiry—and considering actual 
evidence regarding the grantor’s intent—the court folded the inquiry 
into its larger formalist picture, concluding that “[i]t is reasonable to 
presume that when Benjamin Rosenberg made the donation in 
question he was aware of the fact that the ancient Jewish religion had 
in the past undergone certain changes, modifications or evolutions in 
its ritual, forms, and ceremonies.”101 On this basis, the court inferred 
“that he must have contemplated that such changes would inevitably 
occur in the future”102 and opted against gathering more evidence to 
interpret what was meant by “Orthodox Judaism.”103 
 
 96. Id. at 525–26. Many congregations have found themselves in divisive debates over 
seating arrangements, including several that resulted in litigation. See, e.g., Davis v. Scher, 97 
N.W.2d 137 (Mich. 1959) (adjudicating a dispute over mixed-gender seating in a synagogue). 
 97. Katz, 127 So. 2d at 533. 
 98. Id. at 527–32. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 532–33. For a similar critique of Katz, focusing more directly on the 
Establishment Clause concerns than on the larger issues of contract interpretation, see Ellman, 
supra note 11, at 1416 (“What the courts needed to decide in the synagogue cases was not the 
essence of Judaism, an unconstitutional if not impossible task, but rather the essence of the 
grantor’s intent. The courts ought to have determined whether the language of the trust 
instrument by which the grantor conditioned his gift should have been construed, under normal 
rules of interpretation, to bar mixed seating.”). 
 101. Katz, 127 So. 2d at 532–33 (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. at 533. It is worth emphasizing that a true antiformalist approach does not construct 
subjective intent by simply relying on theological propositions. For example, in Wolf v. Rose 
Hill Cemetery Ass’n, 832 P.2d 1007 (Colo. App. 1991), a Colorado appellate court reversed a 
trial-court decision that had denied a woman’s petition to disinter her father’s and sister’s 
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Cases like Wallace and Katz significantly endanger co-religionist 
commerce because they so severely limit the flexibility of important 
ecclesiastical terms.104 Because co-religionist transactions routinely 
employ ecclesiastical references to specify their relations, the 
translation problem already limits their ability to use alternative 
terms. New Formalism further constrains parties’ ability to elaborate 
or explain, ex post, through parol or contextual evidence, what they 
mean when they use particular ecclesiastical terms. Unsurprisingly, 
courts interpreting religious terminology (to the degree the 
Establishment Clause permits) see far less nuance, depth, and 
variation in those terms than do the parties who chose them. This is 
particularly true for terms that apply to a variety of uncertain 
circumstances over an extended period of time.105 Consequently, a 
formalist approach that prohibits parties from explaining themselves 
 
remains because the trial court had improperly concluded that doing so would contravene 
Orthodox Jewish law. Id. at 1008. Although the trial court appears to have considered 
interpretations of Jewish law as an indication of what the father “would have intended,” the 
tenuous link between Jewish law and the actual intent of the father exposes the trial court’s 
analysis as insufficiently attentive to contextualism, disguising a brand of formalism in 
antiformalist terminology. See generally id. (noting that “[u]ncontroverted testimony indicated 
that the father worked and drove a car on the Sabbath, dined at non-kosher restaurants, and 
only went to synagogue on high holidays which would indicate that he was not an Orthodox 
Jew”).  
 103. In critiquing Ellman, supra note 11, Professor Kent Greenawalt has argued that too 
strong an emphasis on subjective intent might lead a court to improperly use theological 
propositions as a proxy for parties’ intent. See Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 1892. There are 
good reasons to share Greenawalt’s concerns. Indeed, such concerns would seem to counsel 
caution in using antiformalist techniques—such as trade usage or evidence of subjective intent—
when interpreting co-religionist commercial instruments. These concerns should not, however, 
lead us to abandon antiformalism in the co-religionist context, especially given the significant 
problems with pursuing a purely formalist approach.  
 104. Notably, these problems persist in currently active litigation. See, e.g., Plaintiff Shearith 
Israel’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Transfer at 4, 
Congregation Shearith Isr. v. Congregation Jeshuat Isr., 983 F. Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(No. 12-cv-8406) (arguing for ownership of religious property based on a proviso claiming that 
religious services at the synagogue housing the property be conducted “according to the Ritual, 
Rites and Customs of the ORTHODOX SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE JEWS, as at this 
time practiced and observed in the Synagogue of the CONGREGATION SHEARITH 
ISRAEL in the City of New York”). 
 105. Another prominent example of this dynamic—in which parties used religious choice-of-
law provisions—is Sieger v. Sieger, 747 N.Y.S.2d 102 (App. Div. 2002). In Sieger, the contract 
between the parties provided that any disputes arising out of their agreement would be settled 
“in accordance with the regulations of Speyer, Worms, and Mainz.” Id. at 104. But instead of 
using contextual evidence to interpret the provisions, the court refused to enforce them, 
concluding that doing so “would place [the court] in the inappropriate role of deciding whether 
religious law has been violated.” Id. at 105 (quoting Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1033 
(N.Y. 2001)). 
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too often leads to a misunderstanding or undermining of the parties’ 
intents. In these instances, formalist legal reasoning not only impedes 
co-religionists from seeking to engage in rudimentary and mutually 
beneficial commercial exchange, but it even undermines the very 
objectives of New Formalism. Rather than enabling parties to write 
clear, readily enforceable contracts, New Formalism can invalidate 
many effective, efficient contractual references that co-religionists are 
likely to use. Courts’ commitment to formalism leaves the parties with 
little leeway in enacting their contractual intents. 
B. Traditional Religious Agreements 
As noted above, New Formalism excludes considerations of 
context and intent in deciding questions of contract formation and 
interpretation106 and instead looks to outward manifestations of 
contractual formation and meaning.107 One problem with applying this 
approach to co-religionist relationships is that it sometimes presumes 
contractual intent when no such intent exists. Indeed, co-religionists 
often participate in ceremonial events highlighted by religious 
documents that are intended to reflect religious symbolism rather 
than contractual obligations.108 Such distinctions are typically obvious 
to the participants who share religious affiliations—and who 
therefore understand the shared customs of the given religious 
community—but formalism’s discounting of context ignores such 
shared understandings, leading courts to enforce ceremony as 
 
 106. See Bowers, supra note 70, at 1273; Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: 
Some Realism About the New Formalism (with Particular Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 15–16 (2001); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New 
Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 
101 (2009). But see Jonathan Yovel, Relational Formalism and the Construction of Financial 
Instruments, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 371, 372 (2011). 
 107. See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 781, 789–92 (1999) (critiquing erosion doctrines that are vital to contextual 
interpretation, such as waiver and course of performance); Charny, supra note 19, at 854–55 
(lamenting antiformalists’ willingness to consider “general norms of fairness . . . ; bans on 
certain types of intentional advantage-taking; or . . . considerations of need” when interpreting a 
contract); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 20, at 618 (proposing an economic model that 
discourages the use of extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of contracts between firms); 
William C. Whitford, Relational Contracts and the New Formalism, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 631, 643 
(2004) (describing New Formalism as rekindling the neoclassical touchstones of “plain meaning, 
. . . a strict parol evidence rule, and . . . the indefiniteness doctrine”). 
 108. Of course, the fact that such documents no longer reflect contractual intentions is not 
to say that they cease to have importance within the given religious community. Indeed, 
attempts to modify the form of such documents will likely be met with fierce resistance.  
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contract. Moreover, the traditions surrounding the use of such 
religious documents are often quite rigid, limiting the parties’ ability 
to modify the substance of those documents or to tailor them to 
capture the parties’ specific religious intent. As a result, a strict 
application of contractual formalism is unlikely to lead to the 
modification of the religious documents, and a textualist reading of 
those documents will likely generate misinterpretations of intent. 
One illustration of this challenge routinely surfaces in disputes 
over Islamic mahr agreements,109 which are contracts executed as part 
of the traditional Islamic marriage process.110 Such mahr agreements 
are given by the groom to the bride in exchange for the bride entering 
into the marriage contract,111 and generally require the husband to 
 
 109. See, e.g., Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 248–49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) 
(enforcing a mahr agreement because it met the requirements of secular contract law); 
Soleimani v. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Aug. 28, 2012), available at http://www.
volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/soleimani.pdf (discussing why Establishment Clause 
principles precluded the interpretation of a mahr agreement); Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 
96, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002) (concluding that a mahr agreement was not invalid simply 
because it was entered into at the marriage ceremony); Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); Aziz v. Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (enforcing 
a mahr agreement because it met the requirements of secular contract law); Zawahiri v. 
Alwattar, No. 07AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *5–6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (upholding the lower 
court’s finding that a mahr provision of an Islamic marriage contract was void because the 
parties did not discuss the provision until the day of marriage, and because of the hurried 
negotiation conditions); Ahmed v. Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d 190, 195–96 (Tex. App. 2008) (using 
parol evidence to supplement a mahr agreement, but remanding the case for reconsideration as 
to whether the agreement complied with the statutory requirements for antenuptial agreements 
because the agreement was signed after the parties were civilly married); In re Marriage of 
Obaidi, 226 P.3d 787, 788, 791–92 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a mahr agreement was 
unenforceable for a variety of reasons, including because the terms of the agreement failed to 
sufficiently describe the husband’s financial obligation; the contract’s negotiation was conducted 
in Farsi, which the husband did not speak; and the husband only learned that he would be 
signing a mahr agreement, an agreement with which he was not familiar, at the marriage 
ceremony); Zawahiri v. Alwattar, No. 07 DR-02-756 (Ohio Ct. of Common Pleas Oct. 10, 2007) 
(refusing to enforce a mahr agreement on Establishment Clause grounds).  
 110. Under Islamic law, a husband’s mahr obligations exist in the absence of a contractual 
arrangement; they are a legal requirement of marriage itself. See Oman, Bargaining, supra note 
56, at 590 (“Under the classical fiqh, a marriage contract is not valid without a mahr.”). Indeed, 
the amount that the husband must pay under the mahr obligation would be determined by a 
court in the absence of an agreement. See Chelsea A. Sizemore, Enforcing Islamic Mahr 
Agreements: The American Judge’s Interpretational Dilemma, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1085, 
1087 (2011) (“If the marriage contract does not contain a specified mahr, the husband still must 
pay the wife a judicially determined sum, typically based on the mahr amount that women of 
equivalent social status receive.”). 
 111. See Shiva Falsafi, Religion, Women, and the Holy Grail of Legal Pluralism, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1881, 1914 (2014) (“The Qur’an defines the mahr as a gift to the bride for 
entering into the marriage contract.”); see also QUR’AN 4:4 (“And give the women (on 
marriage) their mahr as a (nikah) free gift”). It is worth noting that whereas the Qur’an 
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make two financial payments to his wife. The first of these payments 
is given to the wife immediately upon marriage; the second portion—
the deferred mahr—is held in trust for the wife to be distributed in 
the event of divorce or the husband’s death.112 Courts have struggled 
with, and scholars have debated,113 how to resolve disputes over mahr 
agreements, in large part because they stand at the nexus of three 
areas of law: statutory rules governing both pre- and postnuptial 
agreements; common-law contract doctrines, such as mutual assent, 
integration, and parol evidence; and constitutional law, most notably 
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. 
On its face, the mahr agreement is a standard financial 
agreement that obligates the husband, in the event of divorce, to 
provide his wife a financial payment. However, because the mahr is a 
staple of a traditional Muslim wedding ceremony, its presentation and 
ceremonial signing reveal mixed motivations and multiple 
objectives.114 To illustrate, in In re the Marriage of Obaidi the court 
described the defense of one husband, Khalid Qayoum, in refusing to 
pay his ex-wife the payment required by their mahr: 
The Nikkah [wedding] ceremony was conducted in Farsi, except 
when Mr. Aji-sab, who performed the ceremony, asked Mr. 
Qayoum if he wanted to marry Ms. Obaidi. Mr. Qayoum does not 
speak, read, or write Farsi. Mr. Qayoum has lived in the United 
States for all but two or three years of his life. He considers himself 
“American first.” He explained that he went through the Afghan 
marriage process because his mother was concerned that he would 
lose even the small amount of cultural knowledge he had about 
 
describes the mahr as a “gift,” it is a “mandatory part of an Islamic marriage contract.” Falsafi, 
supra, at 1917; see also sources cited supra note 110.  
 112. Oman, Bargaining, supra note 56, at 588–93. To be sure, Islamic law entitles the wife to 
the mahr at the time of marriage, and the deferring of a portion of the mahr “is a matter of 
contractual forbearance on her part.” Oman, How to Judge, supra note 56, at 302. 
  The purpose of the mahr is to ensure that upon the dissolution of marriage, the wife has 
secured assets and is not left completely destitute in the event that the husband is no longer 
providing financial support. See, e.g., Tracie Rogalin Siddiqui, Interpretation of Islamic Marriage 
Contracts by American Courts, 41 FAM. L.Q. 639, 644 (2007).  
 113. See, e.g., Blenkhorn, supra note 56; Richard Freeland, The Islamic Institution of Mahr 
and American Law, 4 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 2, 2–4 (2000); Oman, How to Judge, supra note 56; 
Oman, Bargaining, supra note 56; Trumbull, supra note 56; Ghada G. Qaisi, Note, Religious 
Marriage Contracts: Judicial Enforcement of Mahr Agreements in American Courts, 15 J.L. & 
RELIGION 67, 71–72 (2000). 
 114. Cf. Estin, supra note 57, at 575 (2004) (“Contemporary Islamic marital agreements 
often reflect new expectations and circumstances, and Muslim communities in the United States 
actively debate how to adapt [the mahr’s] traditions to the American legal environment.”). 
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Afghanistan. Mr. Qayoum testified that he had never heard the 
word “mahr” before the day of the Nikkah ceremony.115 
Although the court in Obaidi allowed the contracting context to 
support a defense to the mahr’s enforcement, not all courts are willing 
to resist the general trend of New Formalism when enforcing mahr 
agreements. For example, in Akileh v. Elchalal,116 a Florida court 
enforced a mahr contract on formalist grounds, concluding that for 
the purposes of interpretation the “husband’s subjective intent at the 
time he entered into the agreement is not material in construing the 
contract.”117 And in Aziz v. Aziz,118 a New York court enforced a 
mahr agreement, emphasizing the agreement’s formal conformity 
with the relevant contract doctrines over the husband’s contention 
that the “mahr is a religious document and not enforceable as a 
contract.”119 
To be sure, choosing to enforce such agreements might reflect 
the correct outcome because the parties may, in fact, have intended 
the mahr agreements to reflect actual contractual obligations. But 
courts will not know whether the contractual obligations they choose 
to enforce accurately reflect the parties’ intentions until they 
recognize the limitations of formalism as applied to traditional co-
religionist agreements. 
A similar issue often arises in the context of the ketubah, the 
written document featured in Jewish weddings.120 On the one hand, 
the ketubah literally details a transaction, and marrying couples often 
treat it as a contractual instrument by adding language that accurately 
 
 115. In re Marriage of Obaidi, 226 P.3d 787, 789 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
 116. Akileh v. Elchalal, 666 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 117. Id. at 249. 
 118. Aziz v. Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1985). 
 119. Id. at 124. Other judicial decisions have been more ambiguous as to the relative balance 
they hope to strike between formalist and antiformalist approaches. In Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 
A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002), for example, a New Jersey court enforced a mahr 
contract, outlining a purely formalistic standard against which such agreements should be 
judged. Id. at 98 (“[T]he Mahr Agreement in the case at bar is nothing more and nothing less 
than a simple contract between two consenting adults.”). The court reviewed the context of the 
agreement, detailing video evidence of the negotiation and the signing of the contract, but it 
provided limited justification for inferring contractual—as opposed to ceremonial—intent from 
the husband’s signing the agreement. Id. at 97. 
 120. See generally J. David Bleich, Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature: The 
Ketubah, 31:2 TRADITION 50, 53–55 (1997) (discussing the role of the ketubah in Jewish 
marriage ceremonies). 
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reflects an intent to be bound by a promise.121 Yet on the other hand, 
the ketubah’s language is rarely read and understood by the marrying 
couple, and it is often brought into the modern wedding ceremony to 
pay homage to old traditions and imbue the wedding with religious 
symbolism, rather than to memorialize a specific, negotiated 
agreement.122 Relying on formalist logic, courts have interpreted the 
ketubah to subject the parties to a variety of contractual obligations—
obligations neither party may ever have intended—including an 
obligation to submit to the authority of a rabbinical tribunal in order 
to execute a religious divorce.123 Rarely have courts inquired whether 
the agreements manifest contractual intent or simply manifest 
customary symbolism. 
The problems associated with confusing ceremony for contract 
are not limited to the marriage context; they can just as easily 
undermine arm’s-length commercial arrangements. In Colby v. 
Newman,124 for example, the court scrutinized the enforceability of a 
so-called “Sabbath Partnership Agreement.”125 The original 
transaction between the parties included a purchase of assets and an 
employment agreement, whereby the defendants hired the individual 
plaintiffs.126 However, the defendants also proposed to execute an 
agreement that would transfer ownership of the business to plaintiffs 
on the Jewish Sabbath and “Jewish Holidays.”127 The purpose of this 
agreement was to allow the defendants to keep their businesses open 
 
 121. See Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract and the 
First Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312, 346–48 (1992) (describing the contractual provisions of 
the ketubah); Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial 
Agreements, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 359, 375–76 (1999) (describing the trend within 
Conservative Judaism to insert the “Lieberman Clause” into the ketubah). 
 122. See, e.g., Breitowitz, supra note 121, at 347; Linda S. Kahan, Note, Jewish Divorce and 
Secular Courts: The Promise of Avitzur, 73 GEO. L.J. 193, 216–17 (1984).  
 123. See, e.g., Scholl v. Scholl, 621 A.2d 808, 813 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1992); Minkin v. Minkin, 434 
A.2d 665, 665–66 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981); Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. 
1983).  
  It is also worth noting that some courts have refused to enforce these provisions of the 
ketubah on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523, 528–29 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996). Such cases may represent a significant irony; to avoid the 
consequences of potentially exaggerating the degree of contractual intent manifested by the 
ketubah, courts may have to exaggerate the scope of the Establishment Clause. 
 124. Colby v. Newman, 2:11-cv-7413 (C.D. Cal. filed June 11, 2013). 
 125. Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment; to Dismiss; and for Sanctions, Colby v. 
Newman, (C.D. Cal. filed June 11, 2013) (No. 2:11-cv-7413).  
 126. Id. at *2.  
 127. Id. 
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while avoiding Jewish law’s prohibition against engaging in “work” 
on the Jewish Sabbath and Jewish holidays.128 Under the Sabbath 
Partnership Agreement, the business would technically be owned by 
the defendants, whom the plaintiffs assumed were not Jewish.129 
Indeed, the parties alluded to the agreement’s underlying purpose in 
the text of the document itself, which stated: “This deed fulfills all the 
requirements of Jewish Law set forth by the Jewish sages.”130 
According to the terms of the Sabbath Partnership Agreement, the 
plaintiffs were entitled to one-seventh of the profits from the 
business131—profits that the plaintiffs pursued as part of their 
complaint against the defendants.132 
Sabbath Partnership Agreements are common in certain 
religious communities, and they are intended as a religiously 
sanctioned loophole that technically shifts ownership to non-Jews on 
the Jewish Sabbath and holidays.133 Parties enter into these 
agreements to comply with the legal strictures of religious law and 
rarely intend to convey an economic interest via an enforceable 
commercial agreement. In Colby, for example, the plaintiffs, in the 
four years between the execution of the agreement and the filing of 
the lawsuit, never once sought to collect the profits provided for by 
the Sabbath Partnership Agreement.134 Indeed, it was not clear 
whether, before the onset of litigation, the plaintiffs had engaged in 
any conduct typical of business partners, such as attending 
partnership meetings or making the type of business decisions typical 
of partners.135 
 
 128. See Colby v. Newman, 2:11-cv-7413, Document 204, at *7 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 4, 2013). 
 129. As it turned out, the defendants were mistaken in this assumption: the plaintiffs were in 
fact Jewish—an error that led the plaintiffs to claim, albeit unsuccessfully, that the contract 
should be rescinded on the ground of mistake. See id. at *8. 
 130. Colby v. Newman, 2:11-cv-7413, Document 207-9, at *3 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 12, 2013) 
(Exhibit 7). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Second Amended Complaint, Colby v. Newman, (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 29, 2011) (No. 
2:11-cv-7413). 
 133. Cf. Michael J. Broyde & Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Modern Business 
Structures: The Corporate Paradigm, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1685, 1740 (1997) (noting that if Jewish 
law were to conceptualize shareholders as partners in a business, then the “partners” would be 
liable if the business were to operate on the Sabbath).  
 134. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, Colby v. Newman, 2:11-cv-7413, 
(filed Jan. 4, 2013). The defendants framed this argument in terms of laches as opposed to the 
failure of mutual assent. 
 135. Id. 
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The court, however, took a purely formal approach to the 
agreement and opted against considering any contextual evidence 
that could have elucidated the parties’ shared understandings. The 
court explained that it would admit “evidence concerning the parties’ 
intentions” only where there was an ambiguity in the text of the 
contract.136 As a result, it refused to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim to 
profits pursuant to the Sabbath Partnership Agreement, leaving open 
the possibility of transferring millions of dollars to the plaintiffs. 
Conflating ceremony and contract, the court enforced a document 
that neither party had believed to be an enforceable agreement. 
These unanticipated legal outcomes are more than just 
uncomfortable inconveniences. They reflect and contribute to deep 
confusion over both documents designed to codify co-religionist 
commercial dealings and documents that are expressly not intended 
to be anything more than ceremonial.137 Moreover, the typical 
formalist responses to judicial errors—“leave the losses where they 
fall” and correct the judicial error either extralegally or by drafting 
contracts differently138—are, to say the least, inappropriate. For the 
mahr or ketubah, expecting parties to adjust to formalist rules would 
force marrying couples to revise ancient traditions and transform a 
timeless ceremony to unnecessarily avoid judicially superimposed 
commercial consequences. And for some religious players in the 
commercial markets, adjusting to formalism would foreclose 
religiously sanctioned loopholes that have been developed carefully 
over generations to reconcile religious convictions with financial 
needs. However groundbreaking New Formalism has become in 
transforming our understanding and implementation of contract law, 
and in unleashing important transactional efficiencies, these cases 
reveal meaningful limits to the effectiveness of formalism. Surely the 
law can do better than persisting with formalist logic when 
rudimentary circumspection would produce better outcomes. 
 
 136. Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment; to Dismiss; and for Sanctions at *31, Colby 
v. Newman, 2:11-cv-7413 (C.D. Cal. 2013).  
 137. As we note below, there are some instances in which courts have done a far better job 
discerning the shared understanding of parties, thereby distinguishing true co-religionist 
commerce from mere religious ceremony. See infra Part III.B. 
 138. See ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 346 (3d ed. 
2002); see also Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of 
Opportunism Defeats A Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43, 69–70 (2008) (“If 
one applies a textualist approach that does not allow for implied terms or a broad approach to 
judicial interpretation, then courts will be unable to solve some critical problems for the parties, 
which failure will engender deadweight losses.”). 
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III.  ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CREEP 
Formalist approaches to co-religionist commerce have led courts 
to myopic and misleading understandings of ecclesiastical terms and 
co-religionist instruments. The opposite has been true in 
constitutional law, where courts have suffered not from myopia, but 
from operating at too high a level of abstraction. 
In advancing the neutral-principles framework, the Supreme 
Court enabled courts to resolve co-religionist commercial disputes 
while avoiding the religious question doctrine—that is, the 
constitutional prohibition against interpreting religious doctrine or 
practice.139 This framework encourages co-religionist parties to 
remove religious references from instruments they intend to be 
legally enforceable and thus separate ecclesiastical from secular 
matters.140 Following a trend we have termed Establishment Clause 
Creep, however, judicial decisions have slowly moved in the opposite 
direction. Instead of carefully distinguishing secular from 
ecclesiastical issues, courts often conflate the two. And instead of 
using the neutral-principles approach to avoid religious questions, 
courts view religious questions so broadly as to leave little room for 
applying the neutral-principles approach.141 Consequently, courts have 
refused to adjudicate a wider range of disputes than is constitutionally 
 
 139. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 134–37 (arguing that Jones v. Wolf reaffirmed 
courts’ prohibition on resolving religious questions). 
 140. See id.  
 141. Others have worried about excessive judicial expansion of the Establishment Clause to 
cases in which disputes do not implicate religious questions or religious doctrine. See, e.g., 
Muhammad Elsayed, Note & Comment, Contracting Into Religious Law: Anti-Sharia 
Enactments and the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 937, 969 
(2013) (collecting cases and concluding that “[i]n applying the neutral principles of law doctrine, 
some courts have mechanically refused to adjudicate disputes involving religious agreements for 
fear of violating the Establishment Clause. This refusal to sift through complex cases to 
determine where secular matters end and religious doctrine begins can exact a heavy cost on 
religious individuals who may be left without legal recourse as a result of this hypersensitivity in 
dealing with religious disputes” (footnote omitted)); Kevin J. Murphy, Note, Administering the 
Ministerial Exception Post-Hosanna-Tabor: Why Contract Claims Should Not Be Barred, 28 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383, 395 (2014) (collecting cases and concluding that 
“most [courts] read Hosanna-Tabor to bar all wrongful termination claims by ministers 
regardless of the substance of the employment contract”); see also Falsafi, supra note 111, at 
1900–27 (collecting religious-divorce cases and highlighting the problematic application of the 
neutral-principles framework, including repeated overexpansion of the Establishment Clause to 
preclude adjudication of such cases); cf. Ashley Alderman, Where’s the Wall?: Church Property 
Disputes Within the Civil Courts and the Need for Consistent Application of the Law, 39 GA. L. 
REV. 1027, 1042–51 (2005) (collecting cases and highlighting systemic uncertainty and 
inconsistency in the judicial application of the neutral-principles framework). 
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necessary, even those in which rulings could easily avoid deciding 
questions of religious law and doctrine. When courts interpret these 
Establishment Clause prohibitions so broadly, they thwart the shared 
intent of the parties and undermine co-religionist commercial 
markets. 
A. Contract and Context: Narrowing the Space for Neutral Principles 
As noted above, courts have struggled to address the recent 
influx of cases contesting the enforceability of mahr contracts.142 For 
example, in Soleimani v. Soleimani,143 a Kansas state court refused to 
enforce a mahr agreement.144 After concluding that the document, 
which was written in Farsi, had no agreed-upon translation,145 the 
court then determined that the document presented such unfamiliar 
questions that parol evidence would not “aid the court.”146 The court 
thus deemed the mahr unenforceable.147 
But the Kansas court’s reluctance to enforce the agreement went 
far beyond any concern over enforcing an irreparably vague 
document. To the contrary, the court concluded that mahr 
agreements are inherently suspect because “they stem from 
jurisdictions that do not separate church and state, and may, in fact, 
embed discrimination through religious doctrine.”148 The court thus 
worried that enforcing such agreements threatened equal-protection 
requirements because the process of divorce in Islamic law entails the 
“basic denial of due process” by granting the husband the power to 
unilaterally effectuate the divorce.149 To enforce mahr agreements 
would “[p]erpetuat[e] such discrimination under the guise of judicial 
 
 142. See supra notes 109–19 and accompanying text. 
 143. Soleimani v. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Aug. 28, 2012), available at 
http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/soleimani.pdf.  
 144. Id. at 33–34. 
 145. Id. at 12–13. The court also emphasized that the amount of the deferred mahr—
$677,000—was so large that it functioned as a penalty for divorce. Id. at 26. Therefore, enforcing 
the mahr would have violated public policy. Id. at 26–29. 
 146. Id. at 26. 
 147. This conclusion was itself somewhat surprising under standard common-law contract 
grounds. The court did note that the parties had agreed upon the existence of a contract and to 
the contract’s “critical terms.” Id. at 14. Thus, it is unclear why the court could not use parol 
evidence to supplement the agreement and fill in the necessary gaps created by the lack of an 
authenticated translation. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216(1) 
(“Evidence of a consistent additional term is admissible to supplement an integrated agreement 
unless the court finds that the agreement was completely integrated.”). 
 148. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668 at 29. 
 149. Id. at 30. 
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sensitivity to Establishment Clause prohibitions,” and thereby 
“abdicate the judiciary’s overall constitutional role to protect such 
fundamental rights.”150 The court also invoked Kansas’s recently 
enacted “anti-Sharia law”;151 like many of its counterparts in other 
jurisdictions,152 the anti-Sharia law renders contracts unenforceable 
when they incorporate rules from foreign or religious legal systems 
“that would not grant the parties the same fundamental liberties, 
rights and privileges granted under the United States and Kansas 
constitutions.”153 
The mahr, however, need not be viewed as an inherently 
religious or foreign instrument. The wife, in asking the court to 
enforce the agreement, described the mahr merely as a severable and 
independent financial agreement that should be interpreted and 
enforced using “neutral principles of law.”154 The court, however, 
refused, ruling: 
Even assuming this Court could interpret the contract, it would then 
be put in the dilemma of fashioning a remedy under a contract that 
clearly emanates from a legal code that may be antithetical to 
 
 150. Id. The court never quite explained how enforcing the mahr agreement in question 
would perpetuate the alleged discrimination. It is far from clear how preventing a wife from 
enforcing an agreement requiring her husband to pay a debt to her—in this case, a substantial 
debt of $677,000—would further perpetuate an allegedly discriminatory system whereby the 
husband exercised too much authority. 
 151. See, e.g., ASSOCIATED PRESS, Anti-Shariah Bill Advances in Kansas, BOS. GLOBE, May 
12, 2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2012/05/11/anti-shariah-bill-advances-kansas/
UXdUEob8p17YmgHKZabRCJ/story.html. 
 152. See Omar Sacirbey, Anti-Sharia Movement Gains Success, HUFFINGTON POST (May 17, 
2013, 12:19 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/17/anti-shariah-movement-gains-
success_n_3290110.html (noting that six states have enacted various forms of the so-called anti-
Sharia laws); see also Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: OK Approves New Ban; 
WA Approves Modified Version; AL Approves Sweeping Constitutional Amendment; MO 
Governor May Sign or Veto, GAVEL TO GAVEL (May 23, 2013), http://gaveltogavel.us/
site/2013/05/23/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-ok-approves-new-ban-wa-approves
-modified-version-al-approves-sweeping-constitutional-amendment-mo-governor-may-sign-or-
veto (providing an overview of recent legislation regarding use of religious law).  
 153. House Substitute for Senate Bill No. 79, 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws, 1089, § 4. It is worth 
noting that the law requires that the contractual provision in question incorporate law that 
undermines fundamental liberties “as applied to the dispute at issue,” a qualification that was not 
only unaddressed by the court, but that would appear to undermine the court’s decision. Id. 
(emphasis added). Indeed, by the terms of the statute, in Soleimani, it should not have been 
enough to simply state that the mahr’s contractual provision connected to the same general legal 
system or religious community that elsewhere employed a process deemed “discriminatory,” 
just because the process of divorce was not “at issue.” 
 154. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668 at 34. 
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Kansas law. To suggest the mahr obligation is neutrally severable 
from its religious context is not apparent.155 
Leaving aside the extraordinary implications of the word 
“antithetical,” the court’s contention that commercial instruments are 
inseparable from their “religious context” crisply reflects how 
Establishment Clause Creep has expanded Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence to threaten the integrity and reliability of co-religionist 
commercial arrangements.156 Moreover, in refusing to apply the 
Supreme Court’s neutral-principles doctrine—and actually aiming to 
discard the doctrine altogether, calling it “more hopeful than 
realistic”157—the court suggested that recent interpretations of the 
Religion Clauses might remove any remaining legal protection upon 
which co-religionist commerce relies.158 Although the court’s language 
is especially stark and uncompromising, it reveals the potential for a 
court to use the Establishment Clause to invalidate the most intimate 
arrangements, including one that intersects with family law and takes 
place within a distinct ethnically homogeneous context. 
 
 155. Id. at 31. Indeed, in the event there was any question as to the court’s view of mahr 
agreements, the court’s concluding discussion of the mahr answered with the following 
proclamation: 
[T]he protection of Kansas law, applicable to the parties here, requires an equitable 
division of property in a secular system that is not controlled by the dictates of 
religious authorities or even a society dominated by men who place values on women 
in medieval terms. 
Id. at 36. Of course, by refusing to enforce the mahr, the court prevented the wife from 
collecting $677,000. Instead, the court allowed the husband to retain his premarital property 
because he had given his wife $116,000 before their marriage. Id. The court also refused to 
require the husband to provide continuing spousal support. Id. at 39. 
 156. At one point in the decision, the court states that its primary worry is the way in which 
the mahr agreement degrades women by conceptualizing them as “chattel.” Id. at 33. It does so, 
explained the court, because the mahr is “almost always . . . ill-defined, leaving some Islamic 
courts to infer a mahr amount.” Id. And this valuation process, which uses criteria such as 
family, beauty and virginity, “suggests [that] women are, comparatively-speaking, chattel, not 
human beings. This entire valuation process is contrary to American jurisprudence . . . .” Id. Of 
course, none of these worries were implicated in the case before the court because the mahr 
agreement specified the amount of the mahr, therefore obviating the need for a valuation 
process.  
 157. Id. at 34–35. 
 158. At one point, the court cites Nathan Oman’s article How to Judge Shari’a Contracts: A 
Guide to Islamic Marriage Agreements in American Courts, supra note 56, at 314, as support for 
its claim that a mahr agreement could not be severed from its religious context, Soleimani, No. 
11CV4668 at 31. Oman argues, however, that the relationship between the mahr and its context 
should lead to enforcing the mahr, but not as a premarital agreement. Oman, How to Judge, 
supra note 56, at 323–24. This ensures that the wife can collect the secured debt of the mahr 
from her husband without forgoing any other claims in the distribution of the marital property. 
Id. 
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This resistance to enforcing co-religionist commercial 
instruments—and its application in the context of Islamic contracts—
is being noticed by more than soon-to-be-married couples. The 
financial press has reported that, in large part because of rulings on 
mahr agreements like Soleimani, the United States is not perceived to 
be hospitable to the growing market for Islamic finance.159 In fact, 
Fitch Ratings recently observed that U.S. legal precedents serve as 
“[o]ne of the main limitations [preventing] effective enforcement” of 
Islamic bonds. Although the Islamic bond market is growing 
worldwide, Fitch Ratings warned that “[i]t remains uncertain whether 
certificate holders will be able to enforce their contractual rights in 
[U.S.] courts.”160 These uncertainties are only exacerbated by the 
continued barrage of legislative initiatives in several states to pass 
anti-Sharia laws.161  
These concerns are a material indicator of the economic harm—
to say nothing of limitations on religious commitments—imposed by 
Establishment Clause Creep. Although there has been little litigation 
over Islamic bond instruments,162 the growing case law over mahr 
 
 159. Mushfique Shams Billah, Arab Money: Why Isn’t the United States Getting Any?, 32 U. 
PA. J. INT’L L. 1055, 1092–93 (2011) (identifying First Amendment doctrine as a perceived 
“barrier to Islamic finance in the United States”). In contrast, British regulators have taken 
steps to facilitate the growth of Islamic finance in the United Kingdom, exempting various 
Islamic financial instruments (sukuk) and similar bonds from certain domestic regulations. See 
Ben Meggeson, Time for Britain to Sukuk and See, SNL FINANCIAL (Feb. 1, 2013). 
  Islamic finance or Sharia-compliant finance generally refers to banking and investment 
activity that conforms with the requirements of Islamic law. Thus, for a fund to be Sharia-
compliant, it  
may not invest in assets that violate the basic tenets of Islamic finance, which 
proscribe: (1) riba (literally defined as “an increase” but commonly translated as 
“interest”); (2) transactions that are gharar (an excessive uncertainty or speculation); 
and (3) certain morally reprehensible industries according to Islam (such as those 
engaging in gambling or pork products). 
Russell Powell & Arthur DeLong, The Possible Advantages of Islamic Financial Jurisprudence: 
An Empirical Study of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
393, 397 (2014).  
 160. Fitch: Sukuk 2013 Issuance Outlook Positive Following Solid 2012, REUTERS, Jan. 14, 
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/14/idUSWLA005W820130114. 
 161. For examples of other anti-Sharia laws, see supra note 152. To be sure, some have 
argued that Establishment Clause questions are more of a “sideshow” and that the primary 
obstacles to Sharia-compliant finance in the United States stem from tax and regulatory rules. 
E.g., Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Impossible, Highly Desired Islamic Bank, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. 
L. REV. 105, 147 (2014). 
 162. There has, however, been some litigation related to the constitutionality of 
governmental entanglement with Sharia-compliant financial instruments. See Murray v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Treasury, 681 F.3d 744, 745 (6th Cir. 2012) (alleging that the Department of Treasury 
violated the Establishment Clause by committing federal dollars to American International 
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agreements and other co-religionist commercial documents has been 
noticed by sophisticated commercial parties, further undermining the 
credibility of many co-religionist commercial instruments. 
B. Confusing Religious Doctrine with Sociological Patterns: Avoiding 
Neutral Principles of Law 
Worries of Establishment Clause Creep do not simply inhabit 
contract cases. Not surprisingly, as co-religionist commerce has 
continued to expand, similar issues have arisen in tort actions, in 
which courts make insufficient use of the neutral-principles approach. 
In these cases too, courts use an overbroad reading of Establishment 
Clause prohibitions to avoid adjudicating tort disputes between co-
religionists.163 
One notable area in which common-law torts and the religious 
question doctrine have tussled is in claims of religious defamation. 
For example, plaintiffs frequently file defamation suits against 
religious leaders or co-religionists who have declared the plaintiffs as 
sinners or as violators of shared religious communal standards of 
behavior.164 When the plaintiff files a claim of defamation, the 
defendant will typically assert the defense of truth, thereby drawing 
the court into a dispute over the truth or falsity of the religious 
claims.165 In turn, courts generally dismiss claims for religious 
defamation on such grounds.166 
 
Group, Inc. via the Troubled Asset Relief Program). For further discussion of Murray, see 
Hamoudi, supra note 161, at 146–50. 
 163. For discussion of judicial treatment of religious tort claims, see Goldstein, supra note 9, 
at 522–23; Idleman, supra note 9, at 219. 
 164. See, e.g., Farley v. Wis. Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 821 F. Supp. 1286, 1287 (D. Minn. 
1993) (hearing a pastor’s defamation suit against his former church organization after the 
organization denied his church’s application to be a mission); Goodman v. Temple Shir Ami, 
Inc., 712 So. 2d 775, 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (detailing a rabbi’s suit against his former 
temple for defamation and breach of employment contract); Downs v. Roman Catholic 
Archbishop, 683 A.2d 808, 810 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (hearing a former priesthood 
candidate’s defamation suit after he was released from the archdiocese on disciplinary grounds); 
Schoenhals v. Mains, 504 N.W.2d 233, 234 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (detailing church members’ 
fraud, defamation, and breach-of-contract suit against their former minister and church over the 
termination of their membership). 
 165. See, e.g., Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200, 219 (D. Conn. 2000) 
(dismissing the plaintiff’s defamation claim because addressing the defense of truth would 
require impermissible entanglement with Canon law); Klagsbrun v. Va’ad Harabonim, 53 F. 
Supp. 2d 732, 742 (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissing the plaintiff’s defamation claim because addressing 
the defense of truth would require impermissible entanglement with Jewish law). 
 166. See cases cited supra note 165. 
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However, not all claims of religious defamation follow this script. 
In Abdelhak v. Jewish Press,167 for example, the plaintiff was an 
Orthodox Jewish doctor, specializing in high-risk obstetrics, who sued 
a Jewish newspaper for defamation because his name was published 
on a list of individuals against whom a rabbinical court had issued a 
seruv—an order of contempt.168 The list included the plaintiff’s name, 
ostensibly because he had failed to grant his wife a divorce in 
accordance with Jewish law.169 But both parties agreed that the 
plaintiff’s name was included on the list due to misinformation 
provided to the newspaper by the rabbinical court.170 This error was 
particularly damaging to the plaintiff because his patients were 
“almost without exception, women of the Orthodox Jewish faith,”171 
and the plaintiff consequently alleged that his reputation within the 
religious community—and, in turn, his medical practice—was 
severely damaged by the newspaper’s erroneous report.172 
Because both parties agreed that listing the plaintiff’s name was 
an error, the court was able to avoid the standard constitutional 
obstacle to adjudicating a claim of religious defamation. The 
newspaper conceded its error and the court thus did not need to 
determine the truth or falsity of a religious claim.173 The court 
nonetheless dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiff’s claim 
required excessive entanglement with religious doctrine.174 Much of 
the court’s reasoning focused on the manner in which the jury would 
be asked to assess damages: 
[N]o jury could determine how much of the decline in plaintiff’s 
income resulted from the defamatory Seruv Listing, and how much 
of the decline resulted from other factors, unless the jury immersed 
itself in Orthodox Jewish beliefs. . . . Such conclusions could not be 
drawn unless, again, the jury were to develop a keen understanding 
of how an Orthodox Jew would view each such event. Such an 
undertaking exemplifies the excessive involvement in matters of 
 
 167. Abdelhak v. Jewish Press Inc., 985 A.2d 197 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009). 
 168. Id. at 200–02. 
 169. Id. at 201–02.  
 170. Id. at 202. 
 171. Id. at 200. 
 172. Id. at 208. 
 173. Id. at 202. In fact, the newspaper issued a retraction noting its error. Id. 
 174. Id. at 211. 
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“faith . . . or ecclesiastical . . . custom” that the [New Jersey 
Supreme] Court prohibited in McKelvey [v. Pierce].175 
One understands the court’s reticence to permit a jury of 
laypeople to speculate into the behavior of a particular ethnic 
community—the circumstances might be unlikely to produce an 
accurate assessment. But although a damages calculation would 
require an inquiry into the social consequences of a seruv, it would 
not require rendering a determination regarding religious doctrine. 
To the contrary, it is an empirical inquiry into social perceptions of 
particular conduct within a given community—in the court’s words, 
“how an Orthodox Jew would view such an event.”176 This sort of 
damages assessment is a standard fact-finding inquiry that juries 
routinely are asked to make in predicting the market consequences of 
certain events, based on expert testimony and submitted evidence.177 
In this way, the court’s holding unnecessarily shrouded much of co-
religionist commerce in deep mystery beyond the purview of judicial 
assessment. Conflating religious doctrine with sociological 
preferences not only offers another example of recent Establishment 
Clause Creep, but it also immunizes tortfeasors against claims from 
their co-religionists. Like contracts that are not enforced, torts 
without redress are another consequence of Establishment Clause 
Creep that exposes religious merchants to risks from which their 
secular counterparts are protected. 
IV.  TOWARD A BETTER CONTEXTUALISM 
Co-religionist commerce stands at the nexus of both public and 
private law precisely because it involves transactions that pursue both 
commercial and religious objectives. It therefore is vulnerable to 
trends in constitutional law and commercial law that have unwittingly 
combined to undermine the ability of co-religionists to secure 
commercial relations. 
 
 175. Id. at 208 (quoting McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 851 (N.J. 2002)). 
 176. Id. 
 177. By way of an example, juries are expected to play this type of fact-finding role in 
obscenity cases, in which they must determine communal standards of decency. See, e.g., Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 (1973) (concluding that courts could continue to rely on juries in 
obscenity cases, which require ascertaining “community standards of decency”); Smith v. 
California, 361 U.S. 147, 164–65 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (endorsing the use of 
experts for determining community standards in obscenity cases).  
  For more critical analysis of Abdelhak, see Helfand, supra note 22, at 193–95; Helfand, 
supra note 9, at 517–18. 
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As Part II shows, New Formalism has prevented courts from 
inquiring into the contracting context to determine the parties’ 
subjective contractual intent, even when commercial instruments are 
written creatively to incorporate religious objectives while avoiding 
Establishment Clause hurdles.178 And Establishment Clause Creep 
has expanded the scope of cases in which courts refuse to enforce co-
religionist dealings on First Amendment grounds.179 Together, these 
two trends have distorted the relationship between co-religionist 
commerce and its particular commercial context, preventing courts 
from providing the legal infrastructure necessary to ensure the 
enforceability and predictability of co-religionist commerce. 
But we need not—and ought not—close the courthouse doors to 
co-religionist commerce. At its core, New Formalism instructs courts 
to avoid identifying and effectuating customary norms and subjective 
expectations because the costs of doing so are sufficiently high that 
parties ex ante would prefer formalist over contextualist 
adjudication.180 New Formalism thus is motivated purely by achieving 
parties’ intents while minimizing transaction and error costs. 
Moreover, it encourages courts to focus on the formal text of 
commercial agreements only because it assumes that parties can react 
to judicial decisions and adapt the terms of their agreements to track 
clear legal rules.181  
However, parties to co-religionist commercial dealings cannot 
similarly capture the advantages of formalism. Co-religionist 
commercial parties have limited leeway to find contractual 
terminology that both accurately reflects the religious objectives of 
the parties and remains sufficiently secular to avoid nonenforcement 
on Establishment Clause grounds; they cannot adapt their 
agreements to the demands of the relevant legal doctrine by using 
formal terms. And these Establishment Clause obstacles have 
become increasingly formidable as courts have expanded the range of 
disputes they refuse to adjudicate on account of Religion Clause 
prohibitions.182 As a result, parties cannot simply avoid costly 
 
 178. See supra Part II.B. 
 179. See supra Part II.A. 
 180. See, e.g., Badawi, supra note 76, at 22–23; Omri Ben-Shahar, The Erosion of Rights by 
Past Breach, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 190, 216 (1999); Scott, supra note 66, at 376. 
 181. See Bernstein, supra note 20, at 1810; Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 138, at 46–47; 
Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT AND COMMERCIAL LAW 152 (Kraus & Walt eds., 2000). 
 182. See supra Part II.A. 
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litigation by circumventing the demands of the Establishment Clause. 
To the contrary, the Establishment Clause often prevents parties 
from correcting the errors generated by New Formalist approaches. 
In short, one of the core presumptions that motivates the efficiency 
rationale of New Formalism is undermined by Establishment Clause 
Creep. 
Accordingly, we advance a limited case for contextualism, which 
will enable courts to take the commercial context into account when 
resolving disputes among co-religionists. This contextualist approach 
offers an antidote to the dual onslaughts of New Formalism and 
Establishment Clause Creep, ensuring that co-religionists can enjoy 
both the legal support necessary to sustain their commercial 
endeavors and the freedom to adhere to their religious principles 
without suffering commercial hardship. Contextualism is necessitated 
in these limited situations by the inability of co-religionists to 
translate religious terms into secular analogs and thus leverage 
private law’s dynamism like other commercial parties.183 
A limited and narrowly circumscribed embrace of contextualism 
would resolve the unusual legal challenges of co-religionist 
commerce. First, contextualism would curtail the encroachment of 
Establishment Clause Creep by discouraging courts from simply 
conflating co-religious commerce with its religious context. 
Contextualism instead encourages factfinders to admit contextual 
evidence to inform the interpretation and enforcement of commercial 
instruments. Factfinders thus would be able to inquire into the unique 
commercial and social environment from which co-religionist 
commerce arises. When parties suffer from purely economic torts or 
have intended to draft enforceable commercial agreements, 
contextualism encourages courts to be sensitive in differentiating the 
commercial elements of an agreement from its ecclesiastical context, 
thereby ensuring that the Establishment Clause does not 
unnecessarily void co-religionist commercial agreements.184 
Second, in contrast to New Formalism’s priority on text and 
outward manifestations, contextualism encourages courts to consider 
the parties’ shared norms, expectations, and intentions when 
 
 183. To be sure, our limited embrace of contextualism is not a religion-specific rule. The 
justification for increased contextualism is based upon the inability of the parties to modify their 
agreements to surmount legal doctrines that undermine enforceability. In this way, the use of 
contextualism is triggered by wholly secular considerations and is not restricted based upon the 
religious nature of the commercial context in question. 
 184. See supra Part III.A. 
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interpreting and enforcing co-religionist commercial agreements. The 
very nature of co-religionist commerce suggests that careful 
evaluation of context will frequently lead courts to different 
conclusions. For example, contextual inquiry may in some cases 
reveal that documents that facially appear to be commercial 
instruments were instead intended by the parties to serve as religious 
symbols and were drafted as part of traditional religious 
ceremonies.185 In other cases, contextual inquiry may provide a basis 
to interpret seemingly religious terminology, thus allowing 
enforcement without encroaching on Establishment Clause 
prohibitions. In this way, contextualism can further ensure the 
enforceability of co-religionist commerce by avoiding Establishment 
Clause pitfalls, using the norms and understandings shared by co-
religionists to fill in gaps and interpret terms in co-religionist 
commercial agreements. 
Because co-religionist commerce offers a narrow—but growing—
instance in which the presumptions of New Formalism do not hold, a 
narrow—but meaningful—exception to formalist adjudication would 
mitigate the twin constraints this Article identifies. A limited 
contextualist correction would merely require courts to consider 
whether the contracting environment and the social norms of the 
commercial parties are such that formalist interpretation leads to an 
incorrect result. A healthy dose of contextualism might help courts 
navigate their way between New Formalism and Establishment 
Clause Creep, providing co-religionist commerce with the 
adjudicative infrastructure it needs to remain viable. 
Fortunately, some courts have resisted rigid formalist analysis of 
co-religionist commercial disputes and have illustrated how 
contextualism can resolve co-religionist disputes. The remainder of 
this Part shows how courts can use limited contextualism to 
adjudicate cases fairly and accurately while maintaining a fidelity to 
the Religion Clauses. 
 
 185. As described above, examples of this phenomenon include documents related to 
religious marriage and divorce—such as the Jewish ketubah and the Islamic mahr agreement—
as well as documents that temporarily shift ownership over commercial goods or enterprises in 
order to account for religious rules and requirements. See supra Part III.B. 
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A. Disentangling Co-Religionist Commerce from Co-Religionist 
Context 
Establishment Clause Creep is predominantly a product of the 
judicial failure to differentiate between the substantive content of 
religious agreements and their surrounding context. In some 
circumstances, however, courts have approached co-religionist 
commercial instruments with surgical precision, carefully extracting 
secular contract terms from their surrounding religious context. In 
Light v. Light,186 for example, a Connecticut court enforced a standard 
prenuptial agreement drafted by a prominent rabbinical court187—the 
Beth Din of America.188 The goal of the Beth Din’s prenuptial 
agreements is to provide the wife with financial leverage to obtain a 
Jewish divorce.189 Since traditional Jewish law grants the husband 
unilateral authority to initiate a divorce,190 the so-called “Jewish 
prenup”191 emerged after creative drafting on the part of lawyers and 
 
 186. Light v. Light, 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2967 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2012). 
 187. See Binding Arbitration Agreement, BETH DIN OF AM., http://theprenup.org/pdf/
Prenup_Standard.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2015) (providing a boilerplate version of an updated 
prenuptial agreement).  
 188. For a discussion of the innovations of the Beth Din of America and of the potential 
lessons to be gleaned from these innovations, see generally Michael J. Broyde, Jewish Law 
Courts in America: Lessons Offered to Sharia Courts by the Beth Din of America Precedent, 57 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 287 (2013). 
 189. See Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 121, at 365 (affirming this sentiment). 
 190. This asymmetry has long been an issue of concern within the Jewish community and 
has been the topic of significant scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Breitowitz, supra note 121, at 
320–21 (analyzing this balance); Estin, supra note 57, at 566 (same); Greenawalt, supra note 15, 
at 812 (same); Ayelet Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Sharing the Pieces 
of Jurisdictional Authority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 405–08 (2000) (same); Suzanne 
Last Stone, The Intervention of American Law in Jewish Divorce: A Pluralist Analysis, 34 ISR. L. 
REV. 170, 175–78 (2000) (same).  
  In response to these issues, New York has famously adopted two “Get Statutes,” which 
authorize courts to account for a husband’s failure to provide his wife with a Jewish divorce 
document when they grant secular divorces and divide marital assets. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 
§ 253 (McKinney 2010); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236B(5)(h), (6)(d) (McKinney 2010). See Lisa 
Zornberg, Beyond the Constitution: Is the New York Get Legislation Good Law?, 15 PACE L. 
REV. 703, 706–07 (1995) (discussing the purpose behind this legislation).  
 191. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Enforcing the “Jewish Prenup”, CTR. FOR L. & RELIGION 
F. (Mar. 29, 2013), http://clrforum.org/2013/03/29/enforcing-the-jewish-prenup; Hannah Scholl, 
Estee Goldschmidt & Marc Herman, Insisting on a Jewish Prenup, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD 
(Mar. 21, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://blogs.forward.com/sisterhood-blog/153359/insisting-on-a-
jewish-prenup.  
HELFAND RICHMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2015  11:51 PM 
2015] CO-RELIGIONIST COMMERCE 815 
rabbis to prevent husbands from using this authority as leverage 
during the course of dissolving their marriages.192  
Although this form prenuptial agreement is intended to 
counteract an inequity in Jewish divorce law, the document itself 
intentionally avoids importing religious terminology or criteria. The 
key provision in these religious prenuptial agreements is the “support 
provision,” which requires the husband to pay his wife $100 per day in 
the event the couple “do[es] not continue domestic residence 
together for whatever reason . . . from the day [the couple] no longer 
continue[s] domestic residence together, and for the duration of [the 
couple’s] Jewish marriage . . . .”193 Thus, the longer the husband 
refuses to provide his wife with a Jewish divorce document, the larger 
his debt grows.194 
The husband in Light sought to have the court invalidate his 
prenuptial agreement on the ground that enforcing such an 
agreement violated the Establishment Clause. He argued that “the 
prenuptial agreement refers to and reflects religious doctrine, 
protocols and ceremonies” and therefore should not be enforced by a 
civil court.195 Nonetheless, the court proceeded to carefully separate 
the agreement from its religious context, stating: 
In the present case, a determination as to whether the prenuptial 
agreement is enforceable would not require the court to delve into 
religious issues. Determining whether the defendant owes the 
plaintiff the specified sum of money does not require the court to 
evaluate the proprieties of religious teachings. Rather, the relief 
sought by the plaintiff is simply to compel the defendant to perform 
a secular obligation, i.e., spousal support payments, to which he 
contractually bound himself.196 
Commentators have noted that the court’s decision—and its careful 
attention to disentangling contractual terms from their religious 
context—offers significant hope for various forms of co-religionist 
 
 192. See Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 121, at 375–78 (discussing the development of 
Jewish prenuptial agreements); Rabbinic Endorsements, THE PRENUP, http://theprenup.org/
rabbinic.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2015). 
 193. Light v. Light, 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2967, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2012). 
 194. See Lang v. Levi, 16 A.3d 980, 991 (Md. App. 2011) (enforcing a religious arbitration 
award which modified the amount due pursuant to a Jewish prenuptial agreement); Mordechai 
Willig, The Prenuptial Agreement: Recent Developments, 1 J. BETH DIN OF AM. 8, 14–15 (2012) 
(further discussing marital negotiations in this context).  
 195. Light, 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2967, at *6–7 .  
 196. Id. at *19. 
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commerce going forward.197 Certainly, the decision in Light offers the 
possibility that parties entering into a religious marriage can structure 
their legal obligations with the help of secular, court-enforced 
instruments.198 The ruling thus validates the use of state-enforced legal 
instruments as a response to problematic religious doctrine that fails 
to address the contemporary needs of a religious community.199 In this 
way, the prenuptial agreement is emblematic of how religious 
communities can employ commercial instruments to achieve religious 
objectives. But Light also illustrates that these agreements are not 
self-enforcing, and the authority of public courts is necessary to 
effectuate their purpose. 
Indeed, this dynamic captures the core rationale behind the 
Supreme Court’s endorsement of the neutral-principles doctrine, 
which “shares the peculiar genius of private-law systems in general—
flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the 
intentions of the parties.”200 Thus, the promise of the neutral-
principles doctrine—to empower religious communities to use private 
legal instruments to organize their affairs—can only be realized to the 
extent courts avoid erroneously conflating a religious context with 
secular elements of an agreement. Put differently, to capitalize on 
what the neutral-principles approach can provide co-religionist 
commerce, courts must beat back Establishment Clause Creep and 
recognize that just because a legal instrument emerges from a 
religious context does not mean that its enforcement requires ruling 
on religious doctrine. 
B. Employing Co-Religionist Context to Interpret Co-Religionist 
Commerce 
A commitment to contextualism encourages courts to recognize 
that sophisticated application of the neutral-principles approach is 
 
 197. Paul Berger, In Victory for ‘Chained’ Wives, Court Upholds Orthodox Prenuptial 
Agreement, THE FORWARD (Feb. 15, 2013), available at http://forward.com/articles/170721/in-
victory-for-chained-wives-court-upholds-o/?p=all#ixzz2NwAbHtuu; Sam Sokol, U.S. Court 
Validates Halachic Prenuptial Agreement, JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 11, 2013), available at http://
www.jpost.com/JewishWorld/JewishNews/Article.aspx?id=302836. 
 198. Berger, supra note 197 (quoting Susan Aranoff, director of the advocacy group Agunah 
International, as noting that the “unanswered question with regard to the prenup was always 
will it be enforceable in civil court”). 
 199. Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Wise Embrace of Commerce, FIRST THINGS “ON THE 
SQUARE” (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2013/02/religionrsquos-wise-
embrace-of-commerce. 
 200. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979). 
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necessary for the continued viability of co-religionist commerce. 
Thus, courts should focus on enforceable neutral principles when 
parties intentionally draft co-religionist commercial agreements using 
secular terms and should not deny access to court enforcement by 
overextending the constitutional prohibition against resolving 
religious questions. But, just as courts must avoid erroneously 
triggering constitutional prohibitions, they must also be sensitive to 
the religious context of particular agreements. Even when an 
instrument or conduct appears devoid of ecclesiastical content, courts 
must nonetheless use contextualism to understand and adjudicate co-
religionist disputes. 
Some courts have successfully employed contextualist 
approaches to ensure that co-religionist agreements were enforced in 
a manner that reflected the shared intentions of the parties. One of 
the most notable examples has been a series of cases addressing heter 
iska (literally, “permissible venture”) agreements, which restructure 
loans as joint ventures to avoid Jewish law’s prohibition against 
usury.201 Accordingly, the intended borrower, instead of simply 
agreeing to pay interest, promises to pay a rate of return on an 
“investment,” typically capped at a rate equal to the intended interest 
rate.202 Although sometimes such heter iska agreements will be 
executed as the sole agreement between the parties, they are often 
executed alongside other documents—anything from a standard loan 
agreement to mortgage documents.203 This device, introduced into the 
Jewish commercial markets sometime between the twelfth and 
fourteenth centuries, enables market participants to grant interest-
bearing loans—but under a different name—thereby technically 
avoiding charging interest in violation of Jewish law.204At bottom, 
 
 201. Steven H. Resnicoff, A Commercial Conundrum: Does Prudence Permit the Jewish 
“Permissible Venture”?, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 80–85 (1989); see generally Jay M. Zitter, 
Application, Recognition, or Consideration of Jewish Law by Courts in United States, 81 
A.L.R.6th 1 (2013) (discussing this claim). 
 202. 2 J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS 376–85 (1983) (discussing 
the Jewish legal background to heter iska agreements); see also YISROEL REISMAN, THE LAWS 
OF RIBBIS 377–407 (1994) (providing further analysis of the Jewish-law rules applicable to the 
heter iska). 
 203. See, e.g., Edelkind v. Fairmont Funding, Ltd., 539 F. Supp. 2d 449, 452 (D. Mass. 2007) 
(executing a heter iska agreement alongside mortgage documents); Heimbinder v. Berkovitz, 
175 Misc. 2d 808, 810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (executing a heter iska agreement alongside loan 
documents); Barclay Commerce Corp. v. Finkelstein, 11 A.D.2d 327, 328 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) 
(executing a heter iska agreement alongside a factoring agreement). 
 204. See Leibovici v. Rawicki, 290 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (Civ. Ct. 1968) (“‘Hetter Isske’ or 
[]heter ‘iska’ was a device developed in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries to overcome the 
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these agreements are best understood as religiously sanctioned 
loopholes to avoid religious rules against charging interest, and do not 
represent the parties’ mutual assent to adopt contractual 
obligations.205 
Not surprisingly, courts have been asked on occasion to interpret 
such heter iska agreements in instances in which the borrower’s 
venture has failed and the creditor would like his loan repaid.206 In 
such circumstances, the borrower will frequently cite the heter iska 
agreement and argue that because the creditor bore the risk that the 
venture would fail, there is no remaining debt under the terms of the 
agreement.207 
By and large, formalism has not lured courts into enforcing heter 
iska agreements.208 To the contrary, courts have employed a variety of 
antiformalist tactics to demonstrate that the parties intended only to 
satisfy a religious formality and never intended these agreements to 
be contractually binding.209 In so doing, courts have emphasized the 
 
biblical prohibition against charging interest by one Jew to another.”); see also BLEICH, supra 
note 202, at 376–85 (discussing the Jewish legal background to heter iska agreements). For 
examples of such agreements, see id. at 385–88 (providing boilerplate heter iska agreements for 
use in different commercial contexts); REISMAN, supra note 202, at 419–24 (same). Heter iska 
agreements typically incorporate heightened evidentiary requirements to prove the venture’s 
losses, and are intended to prevent the borrower from avoiding his obligation to pay the lender. 
See id. at 377–407 (1994). 
 205. See, e.g., Bollag v. Dresdner, 495 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1985) (citing Lester v. 
Levick 376 N.Y.S.2d 619 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)) (noting in the context of a heter iska 
agreement that “[a] transaction must be considered in its totality and judged by its real 
character, rather than by the name, color, or form which the parties assign to it”). 
 206. See, e.g., Barclay Commerce Corp., 11 A.D.2d at 327 (attempting to avoid payment of 
outstanding debts on the basis of a heter iska agreement). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Mahmoud A. El-Gama, Incoherence of Contract-Based Islamic Financial Jurisprudence 
in the Age of Financial Engineering, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 605, 606 (2008) (noting that courts have 
“dismissed the religious-legal characterization of the [heter iska] contract as investment agency 
in favor of treating it as typical interest-based debt”). 
 209. See, e.g., Edelkind, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 450 (accepting a recommendation for the 
dismissal of claims involving a heter iska agreement based on a lack of standing); Leibovici, 290 
N.Y.S.2d at 1000–01 (concluding that the court was not bound by the heter iska agreement); 
Arnav Indus., Inc. v. Westside Realty Assoc., 180 A.D.2d 463 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (failing to 
recognize the existence of a separate heter iska partnership, though a promissory note was 
explicitly written to be in accordance with heter iska); Barclay Commerce Corp., 11 A.D.2d at 
327 (concluding that the heter iska agreement was “merely a compliance in form with Hebraic 
law”); VNB N.Y. Corp. v. 47 Lynbrook LLC, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 364 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 
2012) (concluding that the heter iska agreement did not alter the terms of a note and a 
mortgage). 
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contractual background of heter iska agreements, often emphasizing 
their factual context to infer the true intent of the parties. 
For example, in Heimbeinder v. Berkowitz,210 the court refused to 
enforce a heter iska agreement after taking into consideration a 
variety of contextual factors, including that the defendant had 
produced the agreement from his pocket at the conclusion of the 
closing,211 and that the plaintiff admitted that the defendant had 
executed the heter iska agreement simply “because under Jewish law 
he was ‘not supposed to be charged interest.’”212 The court concluded 
that the heter iska agreement was not intended to be enforceable, but 
“was ‘merely a compliance in form with Hebraic law.’”213 Other courts 
have followed suit, recognizing that just because the form of the heter 
iska resembles a true contract, the context of such agreements clearly 
indicated that the parties did not intend them as enforceable legal 
instruments.214 
Contextualism can also prove useful in enforcing commercial 
elements of the mahr agreement that were intended to be enforced. 
In Ahmed v. Ahmed,215 a dispute over a mahr agreement,216 the 
plaintiff—the defendant’s ex-wife—had been awarded $50,000 by the 
trial court pursuant to the terms of the mahr agreement. The key 
provision of the agreement stated that the parties “have been 
united . . . in matrimony as husband and wife against a Mahr of 
$50,000 of which prompt payment is nil and deferred payment is 
$50,000.”217 The defendant argued on appeal that the agreement was 
simply “‘too vague and uncertain to be enforced’”218 since it failed to 
 
 210. Heimbinder v. Berkovitz, 175 Misc. 2d 808 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998). 
 211. Id. at 817. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See Edelkind, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 454 (citation omitted) (“In civil courts, Shtar Heter 
Iska agreements have been interpreted as ‘merely a compliance in form with Hebraic law,’ that 
does not create a partnership between the parties, and that causes of action based on an attempt 
to create obligations out of such an agreement are ‘devoid of merit.’”); Arnav Indus., Inc., 180 
A.D.2d at 464 (holding that the plaintiff’s claims predicated on a heter iska agreement creating 
a partnership were “devoid of merit”); Barclay Commerce Corp., 11 A.D.2d at 328 (“The 
plaintiff explained the purpose of the ‘Heter Iska’ as being merely a compliance in form with 
Hebraic law, but did not create a partnership or intend to create one and its explanation of the 
‘Heter Iska’ and its purpose is not contradicted by the defendants . . . .”); see also Leibovici, 290 
N.Y.S.2d at 1000 (finding that the parties did not intend to enforce the agreement). 
 215. Ahmed v. Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. App. 2008). 
 216. Id. at 190. 
 217. Id. at 195. 
 218. Id.  
HELFAND RICHMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2015  11:51 PM 
820 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:769 
state who was meant to pay whom, when it would be paid or how it 
was to be paid.219 
But the court resisted such a purely formalist approach, choosing 
instead to treat the mahr as an incomplete document that required 
further evidence to interpret and enforce. The court also avoided 
ruling on what a mahr contract required as a matter of religious 
doctrine, which might have been a constitutionally problematic 
approach. Instead, the court simply zeroed in on the subjective intent 
of the parties. The court thereby leveraged the parties’ shared 
understanding of the mahr agreement to fill in the perceived gaps in 
the document: 
Both parties were raised in the Islamic faith, and Afreen [the 
plaintiff] testified that the Mahr agreement is a contract based on 
Islamic custom and religious principles. Amir [the defendant] 
offered no testimony regarding the Mahr, but Afreen explained that 
the Mahr constitutes a promise of an amount to be paid to the bride 
and if not given before, it must be given at the time of a divorce. If 
credited by the trial court as factfinder, this evidence establishes that 
the parties understood their agreement and that the terms are 
sufficiently specific to be enforced.220 
Importantly, the court did not admit the wife’s testimony as objective 
evidence of the religious doctrine at stake in the mahr contract; 
rather, the court relied on her testimony as evidence of the shared 
subjective understanding of the parties.221 In this way, the court 
explicitly embraced a contextual approach, stating that it “may look 
to the relationship between the parties and the circumstances 
surrounding the contract to determine if the terms were sufficiently 
definite for the parties to understand their obligations.”222 
 
 219. Id. (“Amir contends this language is too vague to be enforceable because it does not 
explain who would make the payment and when and how it would be paid.”); see Appellant’s 
Brief, Ahmed v. Ahmed, No. 14-07-00008, at *13–15 (June 7, 2007) (arguing that the mahr 
agreement was too vague to be enforced). For the full text of the agreement, see id. at *2.  
  Several have also claimed that mahr agreements often lack the requisite specificity and 
certainty to warrant enforcement. See, e.g., Blenkhorn, supra note 56, at 210–18 (arguing that 
the uncertain terms of many mahr contracts should preclude their enforcement). 
 220. Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d at 195 (emphasis added). 
 221. Id. (“If credited by the trial court as factfinder, this evidence establishes that the parties 
understood their agreement and that the terms are sufficiently specific to be enforced.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 222. Id. 
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A similar contextual approach convinced a Washington state 
court to refuse to enforce a mahr agreement. In In re the Marriage of 
Obaidi,223 the court concluded that the defendant lacked any 
understanding of the agreement, emphasizing a variety of contextual 
considerations, including that the defendant did not read Farsi (the 
language in which the mahr agreement had been drafted), had not 
heard of the mahr contract until the day of his wedding, and had 
signed the agreement only at the behest of his mother.224 These 
contextual considerations convinced the court that for this couple, the 
mahr was merely a ritual formality and did not constitute any 
contractual assent.225 
While reaching different outcomes, the state courts in both 
Ahmed and In re the Marriage of Obaidi focused on the parties’ 
subjective intents in deciding whether to enforce a mahr agreement. 
Their contextual approaches illustrate how courts can resolve co-
religionist commercial disputes without encroaching on 
Establishment Clause concerns. This contextual approach allows 
private law to work its “genius” among co-religionists as it does 
among all parties. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article explores the existential threat to co-religionist 
commerce that is being produced by two separate doctrinal 
developments. New Formalism instructs courts to resist considering 
contextual evidence and relational principles that might illuminate 
the contracting parties’ shared intent and understandings. And 
Establishment Clause Creep has caused courts to be increasingly 
reluctant to enforce agreements situated within a religious context. 
The combination has expanded the scope of cases between co-
religionists that result in judicial abstention, rendering contracts 
unenforceable and removing protections from economic torts. 
Consequently, plaintiffs have been left to absorb commercial harms 
without an avenue for judicial remedy, and the viability of co-
religionist commerce has become uncertain. 
The impact of these developments has been vast. They threaten 
the sustainability of multi-billion-dollar markets, and they encroach 
 
 223. In re the Marriage of Obaidi, 226 P.3d 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
 224. Id. at 788–89. 
 225. Id. at 791–92. 
HELFAND RICHMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2015  11:51 PM 
822 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:769 
upon important and intimate dealings in multiple religious 
communities in the United States. They also limit the ability of 
religiously devout individuals to use legal instruments to order their 
affairs and transact with community members in manners consistent 
with their faith. Thus, zealous Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
has combined with formalistic commercial law to, paradoxically, limit 
religious free expression. Understanding co-religionist commerce 
reveals just how central commercial dealings are to co-religionist 
relationships and religious life and how religious expression 
frequently relies upon judicial intervention, not judicial restraint. 
Religion Clause jurisprudence has not fully appreciated how rulings 
aimed at protecting religious practice from state intrusion can instead 
undermine religious dealings between community members, and 
commercial law has not appreciated (at all) that co-religionist 
commerce offers an unusual category of transactions in which the 
logic underlying formalism does not apply. 
This Article suggests a limited embrace of contextualism as a 
solution. By leveraging shared subjective intent, religious norms, and 
communal understandings, courts can selectively navigate the 
doctrinal minefields that cause courts to misunderstand or neglect 
commercial disputes and can provide a more stable adjudicative 
infrastructure for co-religionist commerce. Contextualism has its own 
rich history in both contract and tort law, and this very circumscribed 
invocation can correct some unintended and undesirable excesses of 
combining New Formalism with Establishment Clause Creep. Failing 
to adopt this contextualist correction will add to the uncertainty that 
currently plagues co-religionist commerce and will undermine the 
ability of individuals to simultaneously pursue their religious and 
commercial objectives. Indeed, if both public law and private law 
continue on their current trajectory, there is good reason to believe 
that the foundations of co-religionist commerce will not hold much 
longer, and that the price of participating in commercial markets will 
be that parties must check their religion at the door. 
 
